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1. INTRODUCTION
"Negotiable" is an ambiguous word. In common speech, "ne-
gotiable" is frequently used simply to mean transferable. I On the
other hand, in the negative form it often carries the connotation
that what appears to be a payment instrument is not intended to
be genuine, as in the legend "non-negotiable" that one finds on play
money, bogus checks used in advertising gimmicks, duplicate copies
of money orders, and the like. As that usage indicates, the term has
a great deal to do with the use of written instruments as payment
devices.
Most twentieth century lawyers would probably assert that in
legal usage the term has a specific technical meaning: to say that an
instrument is negotiable means that it is of appropriate type and
form to be governed by the holder in due course rules so that a
bona fide purchaser for value takes the instrument free from all
claims to it and free from most defenses of the parties obligated on
it. Thus, unlike any other form of property, if a negotiable instru-
ment is stolen and passed to a purchaser who qualifies as a holder
in due course, the purchaser takes free of the claim of the true
owner. Moreover, if a note or other negotiable instrument gets into
the hands of one who qualifies as a holder in due course, it can be
enforced against the maker despite most defenses that the maker
would have had against the original payee.
There is, of course, a connection between the legal usage of
negotiable as referring to a special set of rules about the rights of
transferees, and the lay usage of negotiable as meaning something
like "genuine money." The lawyers' usage reflects the basic assump-
tion of the legal profe~sion about the subject known variously as
"Bills and Notes," "Negotiable Instruments Law," or "Commercial
I The definitions given in modern dictionaries range from those referring to simple
transferability, e.g., The Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) ("Capable of being nego-
tiated; transferable or assignable in the ordinary course of business from one person to
another"); to those vaguely aIluding to special legal rules, e.g., The American Heritage
Dictionary of the English Language (1978) ("Capable of being legaIly transferred from one
person to another, either by delivery or by delivery and endorsement"); to, those giving some
version of the technical lawyer's sense of subject to the holder in due course rules, e.g.,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1976)
("that can be transferred or assigned from one person to another in return for equivalent
value by being delivered either with endorsement (as of an instrument payable to order) or
without endorsement (as of an instrument payable to bearer) so that the title passes to the
transferee who is not prejudiced in his rights by any defect or flaw in the title of prior parties
nor by personal defenses available to prior parties among themselves provided in both cases
that the transferee is a bona fide holder without notice").
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Paper": that the holder in due course rules are the necessary legal
attributes of the various instruments that have been used in pay-
ment transactions over the centuries, and therefore that the legal
concept of negotiability has always been the keystone of the law
governing these instruments. The thesis of this article is that these
assumptions, taken as assertions about the history of the law of bills
and notes, are false. I shall attempt to prove that thesis by examining
practice and law concerning bills and notes in the period, extending
from the early eighteenth century to the early nineteenth century,
that I shall refer to as the"classical era" of the law of bills and notes.
Inasmuch as this is the period when the use of bills and notes in
payments was a regular part of commercial life, and when the law
of bills and notes developed into a settled part of Anglo-American
law, one would expect that the concept of negotiability would play
a major role in the law of bills and notes of that era. Surprisingly,
this is not the case. Rather, the evidence indicates that the concept
of negotiability was at most a very minor aspect of the law of bills
and notes in the classical era, and did not play a prominent role in
the law of bills and notes until the late nineteenth century.2
Part II of this article reviews the traditional account of the
significance of negotiability. Part III of the article examines the
major treatises on the law of bills and notes in the classical era,
showing that the concept of negotiability was all but unmentioned
in them. The following three parts of the article attempt to explain
this puzzling phenomenon. Part IV examines the organization of
commerce in the classical era; Part V shows why the problems
addressed by the holder in due course rules would not commonly
have arisen in the characteristic commercial transactions of the
classical era; and Part VI discusses the problems and disputes that
really were of major concern in the law of bills and notes in the
classical era. The final three parts offer some thoughts on the
origins of the myth of negotiability in the late nineteenth century,
and the implications of the findings presented in this article for
modern commercial law and for legal history.
2 This Article focuses on commercial practice and law in the period ending about the
1820s or 1830s. The traditional assumptions concerning negotiable instruments law and
history may be somewhat more accurate as applied to the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
Nonetheless the realization that the law of bills and notes in what I term the classical era was
not centered on the holder in due course rules makes the nineteenth century story far more
complex than is usually assumed. Part VII of the Article offers some tentative hypotheses
about nineteenth century developments.
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At the outset, it may be well to note that the ambiguity of the
term negotiable poses serious difficulties in discussing these matters.
Arguing that "negotiability" has not been an important part of
"negotiable instruments law" sounds like disputing a definitional
truism. As we shall see, however, legal usage of the term negotiable
has not always been as settled as it seems to be today. Accordingly,
it is dangerous to assume that any use of the word negotiable carries
with it the modern legal meaning of "governed by the holder in
due course rules." In the effort to minimize confusion, I shall
generally refer to the body of law as "the law of bills and notes," or
"the law of commercial paper," avoiding the phrase "negotiable
instruments law" except where I specifically intend to call attention
to the ambiguities wrapped up in that phrase. On the other hand,
I shall endeavor to be uniform in usage of the noun form, "nego-
tiability," as referring to the legal concept expressed in the rule that
a holder in due course takes free from claims and defenses.
II. TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
NEGOTIABILITY
The dominant theme of the modern legal profession's sense of
the law of commercial paper is that the concept of negotiability is
and has always been the heart of this body of law. The preeminent
place of the concept of negotiability is apparent from the typical
pattern of organization of virtually any law text on the subject
published from the late nineteenth century to the present. Almost
invariably, books on the law of bills and notes or commercial paper
begin with an introductory chapter or passage explaining the con-
cept of negotiability. This passage will show how the concept of
negotiability differs from the general rules of assignment applicable
to other forms of property, and will explain why this special concept
is essential to commercial transactions.3
3 The following passage from one of the first modern law students' hornbooks on the
law of bills and notes is illustrative:
Negotiability is the property by which certain choses in action, that is, under-
takings to pay, pass from hand to hand like money. The common law knew
nothing of that; or rather the common law repudiated entirely the notion that
a promise by A to B could be treated as a promise extending also to C. The
utmost which the law allowed was assignment; and that only after long debate
and serious misgiving. Assignment merely works the appointment of another
as beneficiary of the assignor's rights; the assignee 'takes the shoes' of the
assignor. That would never have served the purpose of circulating paper; that
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The organization and focus of the balance of such books mirror
the emphasis on the concept of negotiability that one finds in the
introductory passages. The heart of the book will be the chapters
dedicated to the holder in due course rules, specifying the require-
ments for qualification as a holder in due course and the rights that
one acquires by so qualifying. Occasionally, the authors will ex-
plicitly state that the holder in due course concept is the heart of
the subject, and the rest dross.4 Even if the book does not explicitly
state that the holder in due course rules are the most important
thing about this body of law, that message is clear from the book's
organization. The chapter or chapters devoted to the holder in due
course will be the major part of the book, and all other chapters
will emphasize the relationship between the matters under discus-
sion and the holder in due course doctrine. Thus, the chapter on
the definition and formal requirements will explain that the point
of the definitional rules is to specify the requirements that an in-
strument must meet if a purchaser is to qualify as a holder in due
course. The chapter on transfer rules will explain that the key to
the transfer rules is that unless the transfer takes the proper form,
the transferee will not be a holder who can qualify as a holder in
due course. The chapters on defenses to the liabilities of the parties
will consist primarily of a differentiation of the "personal" defenses
that cannot be asserted against a holder in due course from the
"real" defenses that can.
In any event, if the law student has not caught the point by the
end of her law school career, there is always that great separator of
the wheat from the chaff, the bar review course. In the 1958 bar
review course outline on the law of bills and notes, the summary of
Section 52 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, defining
the "holder in due course," includes the remark, printed in boldface
type, all capitals, italics, and a larger font than any other text in the
purpose required a denial of the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. The new taker
of a bill of exchange must have a perfect right, if his purchase was in due
course, a right in no way to be affected by the rights of him from whom he
bought it.
M.M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHEQUES 2-3 (1893). Bigelow
was published by Little, Brown, and Company as part of its "Students' Series," described by
the publisher as "carefully prepared treatises by competent writers on the elements of the
law. Covering subjects taught in distinct courses in the leading law schools." Also published
that year was Charles Norton's HAND-BOOK OF THE LAw OF BILLS AND NOTES, one of the
earliest items in West Publishing Company's "Hornbook Series."
• See, e.g., R. REDFIELD, THE LAw OF COMMERCIAL PAPER 263,316 (1929).
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book, that "THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE SEC-
TION IN THE NIL."5
By the early twentieth century, these assumptions about the
function and importance of the concept of negotiability had become
so deeply engrained in the professional culture that the authors of
works on the law of bills and notes came to assume that the holder
in due course rules have been the key elements of this body of law
from its earliest stages. The introductory section of the modern
books on the law of bills and notes or commercial paper frequently
contain a passage on the development of the "law merchant" and
the process of its incorporation into the common law in the era of
Lord Mansfield. The usual story is that merchants had always rec-
ognized the desirability of transferring debt instruments as a form
of currency and realized that this practice required a system of legal
rules that provided the purchaser of an instrument with the pro-
tections of the holder in due course rules. On this assumption, the
principal theme of the development of the law of bills and notes
was the incorporation of the law merchant's concept of negotiability
into the common law.6
5 SMITH'S REVIEW OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS OR BILLS AND NOTES FOR LAw SCHOOL
AND STATE BAR EXAMINATIONS 55 (1958). BRITTON'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF BILLS AND
NOTES (1943), perhaps the last major pre-V.C.C. work on the law of bills and notes, says
essentially the same thing, though without the flashy typography: "this principle, with its
ramifications, is, by far, the most important principle in the whole law of bills and notes."
6 The following passage from a 1900 work is typical of the story that has become familiar
to several generations of twentieth century lawyers:
Originally all instruments, including bills of exchange, promissory notes
and bank checks were non-negotiable-in the sense that the maker could, when
asked for payment, deduct from the amount due on the instrument any just
claim that he had against the original owner. Such a claim was termed a counter-
claim, or set-off. In the revival of commerce in Italy, in the eleventh century,
merchants and traders, feeling the need of a commercial instrument, similar to
a bank bill that could be used in their barter and trade and commercial trans-
actions, and realizing that no such instrument could be passed from hand to
hand or sold readily, no matter how good the financial standing of the maker
was, if he, the maker, could always insist on adjusting accounts with the original
owner-adopted a custom later known as the law merchant, under which notes,
checks, drafts, and bills of exchange, drawn in certain prescribed forms, and in
the hands of a bOM fide purchaser, could be enforced to their full extent against
the maker, regardless ofcertain defenses or counter-claims that the maker might
have against the original holder. Such instruments were .negotiable and such
was the origin of negotiability.
In England, embarrassments arose in the application of the common law
to these forms of contract and it was only after a long struggle that the courts
engrafted upon the common law the law merchant, by which the parties to bills
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Thus, the traditional account of the significance of negotiability
involves assertions about both substantive commercial law and legal
history. The traditional account holds both that negotiability is an
important and useful concept in modern law and that negotiability
has been the keystone of the law of bills and notes from at least the
eighteenth century, if not long before. In recent years, there has
been some retreat from the view that negotiability is necessarily a
beneficial doctrine in modern commercial transactions. For exam-
ple, during the 1960s and 70s the application of the holder in due
course rules to consumer transactions came under attack, culmi-
nating in 1975 with the promulgation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission rule effectively annulling the doctrine in consumer trans-
actions.7 For the most part, however, the central assumptions about
the history of the law of bills and notes have gone unchallenged.
Ev~n Grant Gilmore, who in one of his last articles suggested that
the twentieth century law of commercial paper was little more than
a relic of a bygone era,8 did not question that negotiability was an
essential doctrine in the commercial law and practice of the late
eighteenth century. Rather, Gilmore only expressed, more force-
fully than most, what many commercial law teachers and scholars
have come to suspect, that modern commercial law may not suffi-
ciently have adapted to the passing of the era in which private debt
instruments circulated as a medium of exchange.
and notes were put upon a footing entirely different from that of parties to
other contracts.
The customs and usages ofmerchants as to negotiability of bills ofexchange
finally came to be recognized and enforced but were not put on a firm basis
until they received the sanction of parliament. Promissory notes were first
recognized by the courts as negotiable and later were refused that recognition.
Their negotiability was at last established in 1705 by a statute passed by parlia-
ment. The principles of this statute have been followed in a general way by the
various states of this country and embodied in statutes.
J.M. OGDEN, THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 9-10 (1909). Ogden's treatise was one
of the major books on the law of bills and notes in the first half of the twentieth century.
Five editions were published from 1909 through 1947. .
The same assertion-that negotiability in its modern sense has been a preeminent concern
of merchants and the law merchant from the late medieval period to the present--ean be
found in numerous other bills and notes treatises of the early twentieth century. E.g.,
M.M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHEQUES 2-3 (1893); D.S.
EDGAR & D.S. EDGAR, JR., LAw OF BILLS AND NoTES 32 (1935); R.A. REDFIELD, THE LAw OF
COMMERCIAL PAPER 4-5 (1929); F.A. WHITNEY, OUTLINE OF BILLS AND NoTES 13-15 (1948).
7 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
8 Gilmore, FOT11Ullism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441,
461 (1979) ("What Article 3 really is is a museum of antiquities-a treasure house crammed
full of ancient artifacts whose use and function have long since been forgotten.").
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Whatever one may think about the role of the holder in due
course rules in modern commercial transactions, it seems nearly
self-evident that negotiability must have been an essential attribute
of commercial instruments in the era, predating modern banking
and currency systems, when private mercantile instruments were
the principal media of exchange. For example, in the United States,
the issuance of legal tender paper money dates only from the time
of the Civil War,9 and the establishment of anything like the modern
managed national currency system in the United States can be dated
only from the National Bank Act of 1864, or perhaps the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913. Prior to the latter part of the nineteenth
century, specie, that is, coined precious metals, was the only money,
in the narrowest sense of legal tender. Commercial transactions
were not, of course, settled by passing around bags of gold or silver.
Rather, payments were commonly made by means of mercantile
bills of exchange, circulating notes issued by individual banks, and
other commercial instruments.
According to the traditional accounts of the history of the law
of bills and notes, the concept of negotiability was absolutely essen-
tial to such payment systems because no one would be willing to
accept a note or bill as a form of currency unless he took it free
from defenses and claims arising out of the transactions in which it
was issued or previously used. Thus, if we looked at sources on bills
and notes law from the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, we would expect to see extensive discussion of the defenses
that could or could not be asserted against a bona fide purchaser
of an instrument and of the rules for qualifying as such a purchaser.
-- In fact, we find exactly the opposite. Odd as it may seem, an ex-
amination of the legal treatises published in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries indicates that the concept of negotiability
played a relatively minor role in the law of bills and notes in that
era.
III. BILLS AND NOTES TREATISES OF THE CLASSICAL ERA
Four books stand out as the preeminent works on the law of
bills and notes in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
9 Moreover, these Civil War "greenbacks" were not regarded as a desirable element of
a permanent monetary system but as at best a necessary evil to meet the extraordinary
circumstances of the war and at worst a flagrant affront to the Constitution, sound public
policy, and morality. See generally Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); A.B.
HEPBURN, A HISTORY OF CURRENCY IN THE UNITED STATES chs. XI-XIV (rev. ed. 1967);
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 367.
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In order of the appearance of the first editions, they are John
Bayley, A Short Treatise on the Law ofBills ofExchange, Cash Bills, and
Promissory Notes (1789);10 Stewart Kyd, A Treatise on the Law of Bills
of Exchange and Promissory Notes (1790);1l Joseph Chitty, A Treatise
on the Law of Bills of Exchange, Checks on Bankers, Promissory Notes,
and Bank-Notes (1799);12 and John Byles, A Practical Compendium of
10 Six editions of Bayley were published in London from 1789 through 1849, as well as
two American editions in 1826 and 1836, and the usual bootleg Dublin printings of some of
the London editions. Bayley himself prepared the second edition, published in 1799, but
after his appointment as ajudge of King's Bench in 1808, the work was taken over by William
Barnes, who put out a third edition in 1813. Barnes, however, died at a young age, and
Bayley, while still on the bench, supervised the fourth and fifth editions in 1822 and 1830.
The sixth, and last edition, edited by George Dowdeswell appeared in 1849, eight years after
Bayley'S death.
The first edition of Bayley, published in 1789 when Bayley was still a student at Grey's
Inn, is' a remarkable book. It runs only seventy pages, and consists of concise statements of
black letter law, unencumbered by any explanation or description of the cases. It has very
much the appearance of the "nutshells" and other such trots so beloved by students even
today. Evidently, though, the market called for more exegesis, for the second and all later
editions added extensive case summaries in the footnotes.
II The first edition of Kyd was published in London in 1790. There was a 1791 Dublin
printing, but the next London edition I have seen was a 1795 edition entitled the third
edition. American editions appeared in 1798 and 1800.
Kyd's treatise was quite different from, and in some ways superior to, Bayley's work.
Where Bayley gave either bare black letter law, or black letter law with supporting case
annotations, Kyd does a very good job of weaving together the statement of rules and
principles with the rationales for the rules given in the decision. Stewart Kyd has the
distinction of being the only author of a bills treatise ever to have been indicted for treason.
In the 1790s he was a member of the Society for Constitutional Information and, along with
Thomas Hardy, John Horne Tooke and ten others, was indicted for high treason in 1794.
Hardy and Tooke were tried first and were acquitted, whereupon the charges against Kyd
were dropped.
12 At least eleven editions of Chitty were published in London from 1799 through 1878,
and sixteen editions in the United States from 1803 through 1885. By the time of its later
editions, it had become a massive tome; the 1885 American edition was a two volume work
running over 1,000 pages.
Joseph Chitty, who lived from 1776 to 1841, might well lay claim to being the patron
saint of legal writers, having been the first to make a good living publishing law books. He
produced treatises on a myriad of subjects from apprentices to variances, as well as an edition
of Blackstone and numerous collections of precedents and statutes. His four sons carr~ed on
the family tradition of law publishing. Joseph Chitty Jr. (c. 1800-1838), best known as the
author of CHI'ITY ON CONTRACTS, also published in 1834 a book on the law of bills, which,
confusingly, bears the same name as many of the editions of his father's work, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND BANKERS CHECKS. The first
hundred pages of this two volume work contain a brief and undistinguished outline of the
law of bills. The value of the work is the following 1,600 pages, consisting of a verbatim
reprinting of all of the statutes on bills and every reported decision of the English courts on
bills and notes, arranged in chronological order, from Martin v. Boure in 1602 to Easley v.
Crockford in 1833. The publication of such a work ij; compelling evidence of the extraordinary
difficulty that nineteenth century lawyers faced in attempting to maintain a working library
of the reporters. That task is not much easier today; were it not for my good fortune in
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the Law ofBills ofExchange, Promissory Notes, Bankers' Cash-Notes, and
Checks (1829).I3 Each of these went through numerous editions.
Together they dominated the field until at least the mid-nineteenth
c~ntury. One can get a very clear picture of the profession's sense
of this body of law by looking at the organization and emphasis of
the topics in these four works.
The contrast between these late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth century works and a typical twentieth century book on ne-
gotiable instruments law could hardly be greater. The twentieth'
century works can aptly be described as books about the concept of
negotiability. Uniformly they begin with a passage explaining the
concept of negotiability and its significance. Uniformly they orga-
nize their treatment of the various issues covered around the special
rights of holders in due course. In the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century books, on the other hand, one finds hardly a
shred of mention of the concept of negotiability or the special rights
of );lolders in due course or bona fide purchasers. Neither Bayley,
nor Kyd, nor Chitty, nor Byles had an introductory passage or
chapter explaining the concept of negotiability in the sense of free-
dom from claims and defenses. None of them had a passage con-
trasting negotiability from mere assignability. None of them had a
separate chapter on holders in due course, or to use the earlier
term, bona fide purchasers for value without notice. None of them
organized the discussion of defenses to actions on negotiable in-
struments around the distinction between those defenses from
which a bona fide purchaser takes free and those to which even a
obtaining a copy of Chitty, Jr., I would probably still have several years to go in finishing this
article, to say nothing of the larger project of which it is a part.
13 BYLES ON BILLS was the authority on the subject, both in England and the United
States, through most of the nineteenth century. Indeed, it still is the standard work in
England; the 26th edition was published in 1988, even outliving Chalmers' work on the Bills
of Exchange Act he had written, which ceased publication in the 1970s.
John Barnard Byles, born in 1801, was a student of Chitty, and had a distinguished
career in practice before being appointed a judge of Common Pleas in 1858. He authored
and edited the bills treatise through the first nine editions, from 1829 to 1866. Thereafter,
the work seems to have been handed down like the family jewels; M.B. Byles appears as
editor in 1874, with W.J.B. Byles taking over in 1899.
In addition to his fame as an author and judge, Byles is also responsible for what, so far
as I know, is the only Bills and Notes joke. The DIctIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY notes
that from his retirement from the bench in 1873 until his death in 1884 he was "a well-
known figure [in London] on his old white horse;" leaving one to wonder why the learned
editors thought it necessary to describe the subject's horse, not standard information in a
DNB entry. Another reference, which I have since misplaced, explains that the old judge
named his horse "Bills" so that as he rode up people could say, "Here comes Byles on Bills,"
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bona fide purchaser takes subject. In short, none of the earlier
works pays much attention to any of the issues or concepts that the
latter works assume to have been the whole point of this body of
law from the very outset.
The contrast between the early twentieth century books and
the treatises of the classical era can readily be seen by examining
the passages describing the distinguishing characteristics of nego-
tiable instruments. The twentieth century books invariably state that
the key definitional characteristic of negotiable instruments is ne-
gotiability, in the sense of freedom from claims and defenses, as
contrasted with mere assignability. Sir William Holdsworth gives a
typical modern definition in his classic work on the history ot En-
glish law:
Before I begin to discuss the question of the origins
of these instruments, it will perhaps be useful to concen-
trate attention upon the object of our search, by recalling
the characteristic features of negotiability in our modern
law. They are three in number: (i) Negotiable instruments
are transferable by delivery if made payable to bearer, or
by indorsement and delivery if made payable to order;
and the transferee to whom they have been thus delivered
can sue upon them in his own name. (ii) Consideration is
presumed. (iii) A transferee, who takes one of these in-
struments in good faith and for value, acquires a good
title, even though his transferor had a defective title, or
no title at all. 14
Thus, to the twentieth century writers, the defining characteristics
are three: (1) transferability, (2) presumption of consideration, and
(3) negotiability in the sense of freedom from claims and defenses.
Moreover, as Holdsworth himself points out elsewhere,15 and as
other writers emphasize, 16 it is the third characteristic, negotiability,
that is truly essential. By contrast, in Byles, we find the following
passage:
By the common law of England no contract or debt
is assignable, our ancestors appearing, in the times of
1< 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 113-14 (1926).
15 [d. at 165 (describing the holder in due course aspect of the negotiable instrument as
"the most important and the most characteristic of all its features").
16 See, e.g., J.M. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW,
25 & n.3 (1955).
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simplicity, to have apprehended from such transfers much
oppression and litigation. But mercantile experience has
proved the assignment of debts to be indispensable, and
bills of exchange to be the most convenient instruments
for facilitating, securing, and authenticating the transfer.
They have, therefore, come into universal use among all
civilized nations, and the common law has recognized
them as part of the law merchant.
The common law again distinguishes contracts into
two kinds: contracts under seal or by deed; and contracts
not under seal or simple contracts. Contracts under seal
are valid without consideration; simple contracts are void
unless consideration be averred in pleading and estab-
lished in evidence.
All the contracts ari~ing upon a bill of exchange are
simple contracts, but they differ from other simple con-
tracts in these two particulars; first, that the benefit of the
contract is assignable at law; secondly, that consideration
will be presumed 'till the contrary appear.I'
For Byles, then, there are two, not three, distinctive characteristics of
negotiable instruments: (1) transferability and (2) presumption of
consideration. The third· characteristic found in the modern defi-
nitions-negotiability in the sense of freedom from claims and de-
fenses-is conspicuously absent. This is not merely a matter of ov-
ersight or peculiarity in expression, for each of the other major
early treatises, Kyd, Bayley, and Chitty, contains a similar passage
specifying the two peculiar characteristics of bills of exchange as
assignability and presumption of consideration,18 as do the numer-
17 J. ByLES, THE LAW OF BILLS & EXCHANGE 2 (8th ed.).
18 J. BAYLEY, supra note 10, at 1 ("A bill of Exchange is a written order or request, and
a Promissory Note a written promise, for the payment of money: the peculiar privileges of
which are, that they are always prima facie presumed to have been made upon a sufficient
consideration, and may be negotiated."): S. KYD, supra note 11, at 30-32 ("But Bills of
Exchange and Promissory Notes, though according to the general principles oflaw, they are
to be considered only as evidences of a simple contract, are yet in this respect regarded as
specialties ... for unless the contrary be shewn by the defendant, they are always presumed
to have been made on a good consideration .... But Bills of Exchange, though only
securities, and consequently things in action, are so highly favored in the law, that not only
are they assignable or negotiable without any fiction, but every person to whom they are
transferred may maintain an action, in his own name, against anyone who has before him,
in the course of their negotiation, rendered himself responsible for their payment."): J.
CHI1TY, ON BILLS 1-2, 7-8 (1779) ("Bills of Exchange, whether foreign or inland, and
Checks or Drafts on Bankers, are instruments by means of which a creditor may assign to a
third person, not originally party to a contract, the legal as well as equitable interest in a debt
raised by it, so as to vest in the assignee a right of action against the original debtor. Such
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ous other works of the same era. 19 Rather, the term "negotiable"
meant quite a different thing to lawyers of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries than it did to lawyers of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century works, ne-
gotiable instruments are distinguished from other forms of contract
by distinguishing negotiability from mere assignability or transfera-
bility. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century works, ne-
gotiable instruments are distinguished from other forms of con-
tracts by distinguishing their assignability from the general common
law rule proscribing the assignment of a chose in action and by
distinguishing the characteristic of presumption of consideration,
which negotiable instruments share with deeds and other specialties,
from the requirement of proof of consideration for other simple
contracts. In short, where modern lawyers regard the term "nego-
tiable" as designating a particular species of transferability, and
hence distinguish sharply between negotiability and assignability,
the lawyers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries used
the term "negotiable" as essentially synonymous with "transfera-
ble."20
In one sense, this difference in usage is not all that remarkable.
It is hornbook law that the ancient comII;lon law hostility to the
assignment of choses in action had all but died out by the latter
part of the nineteenth century. It is not surprising, therefore, that
at the time when the proscription against assignment retained vigor,
being the general description and nature of these instruments, the operation and effect
which is given to them, is obviously directly opposed to an ancient rule of law, the founders
of which refused to give any effect to the transfer of any possibility, right, title, or any other
c!lose in action .... Having thus endeavored to point out the peculiar property of bills of
exchange, in respect of their being assignable, so as to give the assignee a right of action in
his own name, a property which it has been already seen, few other c!loses in action possess,
the author will proceed to state a further leading distinction between contracts evidenced by
bills of exchange and other simple contracts, in respect of the former carrying with them
the same internal evidence of consideration as contracts evidenced by bonds or other spe-
cialties.").
19 E.g.,].I. MAXWELL, A POCKET DICTIONARY OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE,
PROMISSORY NOTES, BANK NOTES, CHECKS 52 (1802); Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAw OF
EVIDENCE ... AND ATREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NoTES 247-48 (1810).
20 See, e.g., Z. SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE ... AND ATREATISE ON BILLS
OF EXCHANGE 298 (1810) ("All bills payable to a certain person, or order, or to the order of
a certain person; or to a certain person, or bearer; or to the bearer generally: or where
equivalent words are used: are transferable by indorsement, or delivering from hand to
hand, ad infinitum: so as to vest the assignee with a right of action, on the instrument against
the parties to it, in his own name. This is what constitutes the negotiable quality of the
instrument ... .").
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lawyers discussing negotiable instruments emphasized their trans-
ferable quality to distinguish them from other non-assignable choses
in action. Once the proscription against assignment had withered,
however, lawyers emphasized the distinctive transfer rules applied
to negotiable instruments as contrasted with the generally applicable
transfer rules. There is, though, a far more important implication.
The traditional account of the history of the law of bills and notes
largely collapses once we realize that when the lawyers of the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries used the term "negotiable,"
they did not have in mind the holder in due course rules and
doctrines.
The traditional story is that the whole point of the law of bills
and notes is to facilitate the transfer of instruments in commerce
by enabling them to circulate free from routine defenses arising out
of the transaction in which they were issued.21 Freedom from rou-
tine defenses is taken to be the key to the use of negotiable instru-
ments. Yet, if we look at the treatises of the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, we simply do not find any such emphasis on
the problem of defenses. Although the twentieth century books
always contain a lengthy section on defenses, organized in accor-
dance with the holder in due course doctrine's distinction between
real and personal defenses, the earlier books have no chapter on
the holder in due course doctrine, and the coverage of defenses is
not organized around that concept. Rather, the matters that would
now be placed under the headings of real and personal defenses
are treated in a variety of places in the books. For example, the
defense that some party to the instrument lacked contractual ca-
pacity, on grounds of infancy, insanity, or the like, which would be
treated in twentieth century books in the section on the real de-
fenses, is often treated in the earlier books in a chapter or chapters
entitled something like "Of the Parties to a Bill of Exchange" along
with many other issues of capacity and agency. Similarly, the de-
fenses that the twentieth century authors take to be the primary
21 See, e.g., Dolan, Standby LeUer of Credit and Fraud (Is the Standby Only Another Invention
of the Goldsmiths in Lombard Street?), 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 12 n.18 (1985) ("The value of the
distinction in the law of negotiable instruments between defenses that are good against the
holder in due course and those that are not lies in the fact that common, commercial defenses
are eliminated and the unusual, egregious defenses are retained. In commercial sales the
most common defenses are failure of consideration, i.e., breach of warranty, and fraud in
the inducement (usually nothing more than a higher degree of warranty breach). Negotiable.
instruments rules take those defenses away from the obligor because if he were to keep them,
negotiable instruments would not work.").
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concern of the law of bills and notes, such as br.each of warranty,
fraud, or other matters relating to t;he <original paye~'s failure
properly to render the performance for which the instrument was
given, are treated in the .earlier books in a v;lriety .9f places, rarely
with much prominence. .
Thus, in both Bayley ,a1J.dKyd the-issues of W~ defenses of
illegality, want, or failure of consideration are not cov€red in the
principal chapters of the books ·o.n the use of bills ~nd major legal
issues concerning bills, but .are tossed into a final chapter on pro-
cedure and evidence in actions .on bills.22 In Chitty, the subject of
consideration and the defenses of illegality, want, or f~ilure of con-
sideration are treated somewhat as an aside in a chapter on the
form of bills of exchange in which Chi.tty giv,es the typical language
,of a bill of exchange, appending the discussion of -consideration to
his mention of the phrase "for value received" that cll,Stomarily
appeared in bills of exchange.23
Even where these authors giv~ defenses of failur.e of consid-
eration and the like more prominence, the discussion is far .from
what one familiar with twentieth century works would expect. In
the twentieth century hooks, the discussion of these ciefenses .focuses
on .the original obligor's effort to raise defenses when sued by a
transferee of the instrument. The matter of defenses betwe~n :!:he
original payee and the maker usually receives only ~rief treatment-
at most 'the author will observe that if the original pay~e sues the
maker, he <;:an raise any defense that would be available to any other-
sort of contractual obligation. Having gotten that obvious point.out
of the way, the author will then turn to the important ~tuff-whe.ther
the maker can raise particular defenses against a holder in .due
course.
In the treatises of the classical era, the emphasis -is just the
reverse. Byles Or] Bills, for example, had, from its .first edition in
1829, a separate chapter entitled "Of the Consideration" ,which
covered, q.mong other things, some of the defenses that twentieth
22 In the first edition of Bayley, this chapter is entitled "Of the Evidence necessa,ry to
intide the Plaintiff to recoyer upon a Bill or N{)te, and the Defence which may be ·set up
against him," and comprises eight pages of the total of seventy pages in th.e book. The
consideration defenses get oply four pages, most o.f that being on illegality of consideration.
Similarly, the first ec;lition of K)'d has a final chapter entitled "Of the Proof necessary at the
Trial, and of the Defence that may be set up there," which accounts for twenty-nine pages
of the total of 160 pages'in the book. The consideration defenses are.covered in the last five
pages of this chapter.
·25 J. CHlTIY, supra note 12, at 49-55.
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century authors would discuss under the heading of real and per-
sonal defenses. Byles begins his chapter on consideration by ex-
plaining that although there is a presumption of consideration in
actions on bills, that presumption may be rebutted in actions be-
tween immediate parties to a bill, so that it becomes necessary to
consider how such defenses, if available, will be treated.24 The chap-
ter then proceeds to the heart of the discussion,' a detailed exami-
nation of whether particular contentions do or do not give rise to
good defenses of want, failure, or illegality of consideration. There
is nothing of the sense, so prominent in the twentieth century books,
that the problem is whether a bona fide purchaser takes subject to
defenses available against the original holder, nor is there any men-
tion of the argument that such special treatment for bona fide
purchasers is necessary in order to promote the use of bills in
commerce.25 Indeed, the phrase "bona fide purchaser" does not
even appear in the discussion.26
The treatises of the late nineteenth century began to give the
holder in due course rules somewhat greater prominence, but it
24 J. BYLES, supra note 13, at 37-38.
25 In Byles' discussion, the principle that a "holder in due cou'rse" is not subject to
defenses is treated only as a consequence of the rules concerning proof of consideration:
The defendant is not in general permitted to put the plaintiff on proof of
the corisideration, without having given him notice before the trial that he will
be called upon to go into such evidence, nor even then, unless the defendant
can make out a primafacie case against him, by showing that the bill was obtained
from the defendant by undue means, as by fraud, felony, or force; or that it
was lost, or that he received no consideration. But he is at liberty to show
positively by his own witness, absence or failure of consideration, without any
notice; at least in an action between immediate parties.
Between immediate parties-that is, between the drawer and acceptor,
between the payee and drawer, between the payee and maker ofa note, between
the indorsee and the indorser, the only consideration is that which moved from
the plaintiff to the defendant, and the absence or failure of this consideration
is a good defense to an action .... But, between remote parties-for example,
between payee and acceptor, between indorsee and acceptor, between indorsee
and remote indorser, two distinct considerations, at least, corne in question:
first, that which the defendant received for his liability; and secondly, that which
the plaintiff gave for his title. If, in such a case, the defendant can show that
he has an equity not to be charged, as if he can prove that he received no
consideration for his liability, or that his signature to the bill was obtained by
force or fraud, it is but reasonable that, after giving due notice to the plaintiff,
he should require the plaintiff to show that he gave a valuable consideration
for the bill, and that therefore the plaintiff has an equity to recover. Accordingly,
an action between remote parties will not fail, unless in an absence or failure
of both of these considerations.
[d.
26 It was not until the eighth edition, published in 1862, that a passage expressly
discussing the rights of a "bona fide holder," so denominated, was added to BYLES ON BILLS.
March 1990] THE MYTH OF NEGOTIABIliTY 281
was not until the 1890s and early twentieth century that the concept
of negotiability came to dominate the profession's sense of this body
of law. Although later editions ofsome of the treatises of the classical
era, particularly Chitty and Byles, continued in use until well into the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several entirely new
major treatises were published in the middle and late nineteenth
century, particularly in America. Three authors' works seem to have
been particularly successful: Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Law
of Bills of Exchange (1843) and Commentaries on the Law of Promissory
Notes (1845),27 Theophilus Parsons's Treatise on the Law ofPromissory
Notes and Bills ofExchange (1863),28 and John Daniel's Treatise on the
Law ofNegotiable Instruments (1876).29
The pattern of organization in Story's treatises is essentially the
same as in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century works,
with the concept of negotiability playing no major role in the or-
ganization of the work.30 Parsons's 1863 treatise, however, begins
to show the influence of the concept of negotiability. Parsons's trea-
tise is, so far as I can tell, the first law book on bills and notes to
include a chapter specifically devoted to the rights of bona fide
holders of instruments.31 Moreover, Parsons seems to have been the
first writer on bills and notes whose discussion of other doctrines
of bills and notes is informed by consideration of the effect of the
27 The first edition of Story's COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE
appeared in 1843, with subsequent editions in 1847, 1853, and 1860. Story published a
separate work, entitled COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PROMISSORY NOTES, AND OF GUAR-
ANTIES OF NOTES, AND CHECKS ON BANKS AND BANKERS, in 1845. The promissory notes work
went through at least seven editions from 1845 through 1878.
28 Theophilus Parsons (1797-1882) was a Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School
from 1848 until 1869. His massive two volume TREATISE ON NoTES AND BILLS was published
in 1863, with a second edition in 1876. Parsons was the son and namesake of the well-known
jurist Theophilus Parsons (1750-1813) who sat as ChiefJustice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court from 1806 until 1813.
29 John Wanvick Daniel (1842-1910) entered the practice ofIaw in Lynchburg, Virginia
in 1866 after service as an officer in the Confederate army. He was a prominent figure in
Virginia politics in the late nineteenth century, serving in the state legislature in the 1870s
and the United States Congress and Senate from 1884 until his death. The first edition of
his TREATISE ON THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS was published in 1876. The work
went through seven editions, the last appearing in 1933.
80 As the passage quoted in note 37, infra, indicates, Story does give a far more explicit
statement than the earlier works of the argument that the circulation of instruments would
be impaired if a purchaser had to inquire into the circumstances of prior transactions.
81 The seventh chapter of the first volume is entitled "Of the Holder" and includes
three sections, "Rights and Duties of the Holder," "Who is a bona fide Holder of Negotiable
Paper," and "Against what Defenses a bona fide Holder is Protected." This is, however, a
rather small part of the book, accounting for less than thirty pages in a work of nearly 1,500
pages.
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rules on subsequent purchasers.32 By the time of Daniel's 1876
treatise, at least some aspects of the typical pattern of the early
twentieth century books begins to appear. Daniel's statement of the
definition of a negotiable instrument explicitly refers to the attribute
of freedom from claims and defenses,33 and he devotes several
chapters to the rules governing bona fide holder status and rights.34
In other respects, however, Daniel looks far more like a treatise of
the classical era than a twentieth century work. The three chapters
on bona fide purchasers are still a fairly small part of the book. By
contrast, the discussion of presentment, protest, and notice of dis-
honor occupies a major part of the book.35
Although the holder in due course rules are given more prom-
inent treatment in these and other mid-nineteenth century treatises
than in the works of the classical era, it was not until the very end
of the nineteenth century that the concept of negotiability began to
play the dominant role familiar to modern lawyers. Starting in the
1890s, there were countless one-volume treatises on the law of bills
and notes, or negotiable instruments, organized, in the manner
32 For example, in his discussion of the formal definitional rules, Parsons notes that:
To learn what qualities are essential to a negotiable promissory note, we must
bear in mind the main purpose of the note, and of the law in relation to it.
This is simply that the note may represent money, and do all the work of money
in business transactions. For this purpose, the first requisite, that, indeed, which
includes all the rest, is certainty .... There should be entire certainty and
precision as to the amount to be paid. The reason of this is especially obvious;
for if the note is to represent money effectually, there must be no chance of
mistakes as to the amount of money of which it takes the place and performs
the office.
PARSONS, supra note 28, at 30,37.
33 An instrument is called negotiable when the legal title to the instrument itself,
and to the whole amount of the money expressed upon its face, may be trans-
ferred from one to another by indorsement and delivery by the holder, or by
delivery only .... But while all choses in action are now transferable, the
negotiable instrument is the only species which carries by transfer a clear title
and a full measure; and like an instrument under seal imports a consideration.
1 DANIEL, supra note 29, at 1, 2.
34 Chaplers twenty-four through twenty-six were entitled, respectively, "Nature and
Rights of a Bona Fide Holder or Purchaser of Bills and Notes;" "Holder of Bills and Notes
Transferred to him as Collateral Security; and Holder of Bills and Notes secured by Mort-
gage," and "Rights of a Bona Fide Holder or Purchaser of Negotiable Instruments originating
in Fraud, Duress, or Violation of Authority."
35 The first edition of Daniel was a two volume work of about 1,500 pages, divided into
six "Books" and subdivided into fifty-six chapters. The three chapters on bona fide holders,
totalling only eighty pages, were included as part of the rather heterogeneous third book,
entitled THE NEGOTIATION OF THE INSTRUMENT which also covered acceptance, presentment,
transfer, and choice of law. By comparison, the entire fourth book, of nearly two hundred
pages, was devoted to protest and notice.
March 1990] THE MYTH OF NEGOTIABILITY 283
described at the beginning of this article, entirely around the con-
cept of negotiability.36
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not mean to say that the rules
that twentieth century lawyers catalog under the heading of holder
in due course were unknown in the classical era of the law of bills
and notes. We do find statements in cases and treatises to the effect
that circulation of bills is important, and that it would hinder cir-
culation if those taking bills had to worry about the particular
circumstances of prior transactions in which the bills had been
used.37 It is, however, quite a different matter to say that the holder
in due course rules were the whole point of the law of bills and
notes. Consider an analogy from the general law of contract. Any
treatise or casebook on the law of contract will include a chapter
dealing with the special problems posed by assignment of contrac-
tual rights. No one, though, would suggest that the rules on assign-
ment are the single most important part of the law of contract;
quite the contrary, that chapter is a prime candidate for omission
as time runs short at the end of a semester. By contrast, in the law
of commercial paper, the assumption has been that the rules on
transfer are the very heart of the law. Thus, we have a major
puzzlement. The twentieth century books all proceed on the as-
sumption that the concept of negotiability and the rules permitting
holders in due course to take free from defenses have always been
the central, defining characteristics of the law of bills and notes, yet
these topics are all but unmentioned in the major legal treatises of
the classical era.
86 E.g., A.W. BAYS, THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER (1911); M.M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS
OF THE LAW OF BILLS, NOTES, AND CHEQUES (1893); C.P. NORTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF BILLS AND NOTES (1893); J.M. OGDEN, THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1909); L.J.
TOMPKINS, THE LAw OF PROMISSORY NOTES, DRAFTS, CHECKS, ETC. (1901); W. WILLIS, THE
LAw OF NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES (1896); S. WILLISTON, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (1915).
87 See, e.g., Collins v. Martin, 1 Bos. & Pul. 648, 126 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1115 (C.P. 1797)
(Eyre, C.].) ("For the purpose of rendering bills of exchange negotiable, the right of property
in them passes with the bills. Every holder with the bills takes the property, and his title is
stamped upon the bills themselves. The property and the possession are inseparable. This
was necessary to make them negotiable, and in this respect they differ essentially from goods
ofwhich the property and possession may be in different persons.");J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAw OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE 219-20 (2d ed. 1847) ("[T]he partial or even total failure
of consideration, or fraud between the antecedent parties, will be no bar to the title of a bona
fide Holder of the Bill, for a valuable consideration This doctrine ... is indispensable
to the security and circulation of negotiable instruments No third person could othenvise
safely purchase any negotiable instrument, for his title might be completely overturned by
some las~ntdefect of this sort, of which he could not have any adequate means of knowledge,
or institute any inquiries, which might not end in doubtful results, or embarrassing difficul-
ties.")
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IV. ORGANIZATION OF COMMERCE IN THE PRE-MoDERN ERA
The first step in understanding the history of the law of bills
and notes is to understand the organization of commerce in the era
in which this law deVeloped and flourished. The traditional view of
the history of the law of bills and notes rests on the assumption that
bills represented the payment obligation of buyers of goods in credit
sales.38 The problem, though, is that it is hard to see how such sales
could have taken place in the era when bills developed. We know
that bills developed in international trade, and were in common
use, at least among sophisticated merchants, as early as the four-
teenth century. Consider, then, a common form of trade in the late
Middle Ages, such as the sale of spices or fine cloth from Italy to
Bruges for redistribution through northern Europe. The traditional
account of negotiable instruments history assumes that the mer-
chant in Venice has sold the goods on credit to a merchant in
Bruges, and that the Bruges merchant has given a bill or note
representing his obligation to pay the purchase price. That assumes
that the two merchants had somehow reached an agreement for
the sale of a specific cargo of spices. How would that occur in a
world without telegraphs, telephones, rapid mail service, or safe
transportation facilities?
Possibly merchants could have reached agreement by mail,
though the post between distant countries was hardly swift or sure.
But why would a merchant in Bruges commit to a sale before the
goods had been shipped? The hazards of transport were so great
that he could not assure that a specific shipment would actually
reach its destination. Moreover, if the risks of non-delivery, damage,
or delay were not enough, there is the matter of price. Our hypo-
thetical transaction assumes that the buyer in Bruges is willing to
commit himself to a purchase at a specific price months in advance
of the arrival of the goods, and, therefore, long before he has any
way of knowing what the market price of such goods is likely to be
at the time he receives them. The perils of the transport of the day
not only endangered any specific shipment, but almost ensured that
the supply of goods to a specific market would fluctuate wildly, and
38 The hypothetical illustrations of bill transactions in the twentieth·century books almost
invariably take this form. See, e.g., A.W. BAYS, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER 24-25 (1911):
D.S. EDGAR & D.S. EDGAR, JR., LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES 13-14 (1935); H.H. HUMBLE, THE
LAw OF BILLS AND NOTES 4-5 (1939); J.M. OGDEN, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE INST~UMENTS
9-10 (1909); R.A. REDFIELD, THE LAw OF COMMERCIAL PAPER 12 (1929); F.A. WHITNEY,
OUTLINE OF BILLS AND NOTES 13-15 (1948).
March 1990] THE MYTH OF NEGOTIABIliTY 285
with it the price. Prediction of future prices, difficult even today in
a world of instantaneous communication and rapid transport, was
nearly impossible in the late middle ages-as is attested by the ready
market that practitioners of the subtle art of price prediction
through astrology found for their services even in the sophisticated
commercial world of sixteenth century Antwerp.39
The solution to this puzzlement is really quite simple. The
Venetian spice merchant did not ship his cargo to a buyer in Bruges.
He shipped to a merchant in Bruges who acted as a commission agent,
selling the goods for the account of the Venetian merchant. The
local sales by the commission agent might be for cash or on credit,
but it was not those sales that gave rise to bills. Rather, bills arose
out of the relationship between the commission agent and his prin-
cipal. Once the commission agent in Bruges had sold the spices, he
was holding funds for the account of his principal. Bills of exchange
developed as a mechanism by which merchants could make use of
the funds lying in the hands of their agents in distant locations.40
59 See R. EHRENBERG, CAPITAL IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE 240-42 (H.M. Lucas
trans. 1928 & reprint 1963).
40 In the simplest form of bill transaction, suppose that some other merchant in Bruges
has shipped goods, such as English wool, to his representative in Venice who has sold them
on commission. The Venetian agent of the Bruges wool merchant has funds due to the
Bruges wool merchant, just as the Bruges agent of the Venetian spice merchant has funds
in Bruges due to the Venetian merchant. If the amounts involved are equal, everyone's
accounts could be squared by having the Bruges representative of the Venetian spice mer-
chant pay money to the Bruges wool merchant, and the Venetian representative of the
Bruges wool merchant pay money to the Venetian spice merchant. The mechanism might
be as follows: in Bruges, the Bruges agent of the Venetian spice merchant would deliver the
money to the Bruges wool merchant who would draw a bill of exchange on the Venetian
agent of the Bruges wool merchant, payable to the Venetian spice merchant. The bill would
be sent to the Venetian spice merchant, who would present it for payment to the Venetian
agent of the Bruges wool merchant. In effect, the Venetian spice merchant's return cargo
becomes the Bruges wool merchant's outward cargo, and vice versa. That, in short, is the
simplest function of the bill of exchange-often referred to in the medieval and renaissance
sources as merchants' exchange.
This account of the function ofbills of exchange, though sufficiently accurate for present
purposes, is considerably simplified. In particular, I have not here gone into the use of bills
of exchange as a lending mechanism in the period in which the canonical proscription against
usury had a major impact on the forms of business investment. Twentieth- century research
in business and economic history, particularly the work of Raymond de Roover, has made it
clear that in the era up to perhaps the early seventeenth century, lending or investment was
a principal function of exchange transactions. See, e.g., R. DE ROOVER, MONEY BANKING AND
CREDIT IN MEDIAEVAL BRUGES (1948); GRESHAM ON FoREIGN EXCHANGE (1949); THE MEDICI
BANK (1948); L'EVOLUTION DE LA LETTRE DE CHANGE XIV-XVIII SIECLES (1953). Accordingly
all of the standard legal historians' accounts of the development of the law of bills and notes
up to the age of Lords Holt and Mansfield are based on a misunderstanding ofearly exchange
transactions. By the period that I refer to as the classical era, however, the usury and lending
286 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:265
This process of settling accounts between merchants and their
foreign representatives was the essence of the development of bills
of exchange. The writings of business and economic historians are
filled with instances in which a merchant instructs his foreign com-
mission agent to make return "in good bills." To take but one
example, Power's research on a fifteenth century family of English
Merchants of the Staple engaged in the export trade in English
wool to Flanders, shows how the Staplers' foreign representatives
transmitted back to England the proceeds of the sale of the wool
via bills of exchange drawn in Flanders by merchants engaged in
the import trade to England:
The third way by which the Staplers could transfer
their money home [other than buying goods for import
or sending coin] was by bills of exchange drawn upon the
London offices of merchants who imported on a large
scale, and this was the method they habitually employed;
they "made it over," as the phrase went, usually by means
of mercers, who were importers buying heavily at the
Flemish marts. The Staplers had Flemish money in Calais,
where they sold, and in the marts, where they collected
their debts; they wanted English money in the Cotswolds
and London, where they bought. The mercers had En-
glish money in London, where they sold, and needed
Flemish money at the marts, where they bought. So the
Stapler on the cont.inent delivered his money to a mercer
and received a bill of exchange payable at a future date
in London in English money, the interest being expressed
in the rate of exchange for different terms ....41
The development of the bill of exchange was an outgrowth of
the development of a system of trade in which the char~cteristic
form of business organization was the shipment of goods from one
merchant to his representative in a distant location for sale by the
foreign representative on commission for the account of the ship-
ping merchant. This form of business organization was by no means
confined to the Italian merchants who developed it. Rather, the
system of trade through commission agent that evolved in Italy in
the fourteenth century spread throughout Europe, and later other
aspects of exchange transactions were no longer of great significance. Thus, the picture of
bill transactions as a means of making use of funds in the hands of one's commission agent
suffices for purposes of this article.
4. Power, The Wool Trade in the Fifteenth Century, in STUDIES IN ENGLISH TRADE IN THE
FIITEENTH CENTURY 68 (E.E. Power & M.M. Postan ed. 1933).
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parts of the world with which Europe traded. It remained the
predominant form of businesiS organization until developments in
communications and transportation in the nineteenth century made
possible other forms of business organization.42
Thus, the commercial transactions that gave rise to bills were
not necessarily credit sales of goods from seller to buyer.43 Rather,
a typical bill transaction was a merchant drawing on his factor for
the proceeds of goods sold on commission.44 The caselaw of the
42 See, e.g., N.S. BUCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN
TRADE 1800-1850 (1925); V. HARRINGTON, THE NEW YORK MERCHANT ON THE EVE OF THE
REVOLUTION 67-72 (1935); R.B. WESTERFIELD, MIDDLEMEN IN ENGLISH BUSINESS (1915);
Willan, The Factor or Agent in Foreign Trade, in STUDIES IN ELIZABETHAN FOREIGN TRADE
(1959). For an account of the causes of the decline of the commission merchant system in
the late nineteenth century, see G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS
(1971).
42 Indeed, there are various indications in the treatises of the classical era that transac-
tions in which a seller draws on a buyer were regarded as exceptional, not ordinary. For
example, Kyd's discussion ofthe phrase "value received" that was commonly included in bills
notes that one occasionally encounters a different phrase, "value in himself," which variant
form would be used where "a merchant draws a Bill of Exchange on one who owes him
money, which he sends to his friend or factor, to procure acceptance and payment." KYD,
supra note 11, at 40-41. Similarly, Glen, writing in 1807, discusses whether a drawee who
had "effects" of the drawer is obligated to accept a bill drawn on him. He concludes that the
answer should be no, because if that were the rule then a seller of goods could draw on the
buyer without the specific consent of the buyer, which Glen thinks would be wholly unrea-
sonable:
When I purchase a bale of br,oad cloth from a merchant of Leeds, or a box of
muslins from a manufacturer of Manchester, I am liable for the price, after the
expiry of the ordinary or stipulated period of credit; but I am not obligated to
accept of bills drawn upon me for the price, without notice, and at random
periods of payment.
GLEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND LETTERS OF
CREDIT IN SCOTLAND 125-26 (1807). If, as is usually assumed, the whole point of bills was
that sellers regularly draw on their customers for each shipment, then there could hardly be
any basis for suggestions of the sort we find here that there is something unusual about such
transactions.
44 Treatises of the classical era commonly provided sample forms of bills of exchange.
The following is one of the examples given in Kyd's 1790 work:
London,january 18th, 1782
Exchange for £50 Sted.
At sight ... pay to Mr. John Rogers, or order, Fifty Pounds sterling, value
received ofhim, and place the same to account, as per advice (or without further
advice) from
SAMUEL SKINNER
To Mr. james jenkins,
Merchant, in Bristol
If such a bill arose out of a merchant-factor transaction, then the parties would have
had the following relations: Samuel Skinner, in London, having shipped goods on commission
to his agent, James Jenkins, in Bristol, draws on the proceeds on the sale of the goods to
make a payment to John Rogers, instructing Jenkins to debit the amount of the bill to
Skinner's running account with Jenkins.
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classical period confirms this picture of the paradigmatic bill of
exchange transaction. In those cases in which the reports contain
sufficient information to identify the nature of the underlying trans-
actions among the parties, the pattern of merchant drawing on ~is
factor frequently appears. For example, in Foxcraft v. Devonshire,45
Satterthwaite shipped goods worth £ 5000 to his factor Devonshire
who sold them for Foxcraft's account and sought to credit the
proceeds against bills drawn by Satterthwaite on Devonshire and
paid by Devonshire.46 Similarly, Maber v. Massias was an action on a
bill drawn by William Watts, an English merchant, on his factor in
Gibraltar, Moses Massias, payable "out of the produce of goods you
have of mine, now lying at Gibraltar, Barbary and Leghorn."47 In
Mason v. Hunt, Rowland Hunt, in Dominica, was said to have agreed
with another firm of merchants in Dominica that if they shipped
tobacco on consignment to Hunt's partner in London, the London
partner would accept bills drawn in anticipation of the proceeds of
the sale of the tobacco.48
The relationship between drawer and drawee was not, though,
confined to that of merchant drawing on his factor. Rather, any
situation in which one person had or might have funds in his hands
belonging to another might form the basis of a bill transaction. One
commonly encounters cases in which an English importer's foreign
factor buys goods for the merchant's account, paying or reimburs-
ing himself by drawing a bill on his principa1.49 Thus, in Francis v.
Rucker, an English firm instructed their correspondent in Philadel-
phia to buy corn for them and ship it to various Mediterranean
ports.50 The Philadelphia correspondent was authorized to draw on
the English merchants for the cost of the corn purchased for their
account.51 Many cases involved bills that arose out of other sorts of
45 1 Black W. 193,96 Eng. Rep. 105 (K.B. 1759).
46 Devonshire had paid the bills in question before he received and sold the goods for
Satterthwaite's account. Satterthwaite's assignee in bankruptcy, Foxcraft, contended that
Devonshire should be denied credit for the bills he paid because Devonshire knew at the
time he paid the bills that Satterthwaite was in failing financial condition and paid the bills
"to support a false credit in his principal." Id. at 105.
47 2 Black W. 1072,96 Eng. Rep. 631, 631 (C.P. 1776).
48 1 Dougl. 297, 99 Eng. Rep. 192, 194 (K.B. 1780).
49 Barnaby v. Rigalt, Cro. Car. 301, 79 Eng. Rep. 864 (C.P. 1633), one of the earliest
reported decisions in the central courts on bills of exchange, is probably a case of this sort,
though the report is too obscure to permit confident conclusion about the facts.
50 Amb. 672, 27 Eng. Rep. 436 (Ch. 1768).
51 The English merchants failed, and their Philadelphia correspondent was required to
pay the bills as drawer. The issue in the case was whether the Philadelphia merchant could
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financial affairs, such as bills drawn on one's banker or other person
who, as the contemporary phrase went, "kept one's cash."52 Indeed,
one might have funds in another's hands in non-mercantile situa-
tions. For example, the case usually cited as the first reported de-
cision on an inland bill, Edgar v. Chut,53 was one in which a parson
in Norfolk had funds in London and consented to draw a bill on
his London friend and give it to a local butcher who needed London
funds to pay for cattle.54 There are also a fair number of cases of
profligate sons surprised to find that dear old dad had finally had
enough and dishonored the bills they had drawn on him.55 Al-
though the relationship between drawer and drawee in these cases
may not have been merchant and factor, all involve essentially the
same form of underlying transaction-the drawee has, or is hoped
to act as if he had, funds of the drawer in his hands. Pnlike the
model of bill transactions assumed in the twentieth century treatises,
these were not cases in which bills were given as embodiments of
obligations to pay for goods sold on credit.
The realization that bills commonly arose out of the obligation
of a commission merchant to return funds held for 1).is principal
sheds a great deal of light on the role of the transferability of bills.
The picture one gets from most modern law books is that merchants
have long wanted some form of transferable paper instrument and
found that bills of exchange met the need. That is putting the cart
before the horse. In the era in which the commission merchant
system of distribution predominated, merchants would invariably
find that they had balances due to them from their correspondents
in various location around the country or the globe. Bills of ex-
change were the mechanism by which they could make use of these
distant balances in the era before the development of a specialized
financial system. That the bills were transferrable facilitated this
system, but it was not the essential key to it. Indeed, one finds many
cases in the classical era in which bills are used as a payment device
without any transfer of the bill itself. For example, if a merchant
prove a claim in the English merchant's bankruptcy for the twenty percent damages that a
holder of a protested bill could recover from the drawer under Pennsylvania law. [d.
52 See, e.g., Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516,97 Eng. Rep. 957 (K.B. 1764) (instrument
drawn by London merchant on his banker).
55 1 Keb. 592, 636, 83 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1663).
54 The parson quickly learned the wages of excessive trust. The butcher failed before
reimbursing the parson, and though the parson had taken the precaution of instructing his
London friend not to pay the bill until the parson got the money, the cattle seller succeeded
in collecting from the parson as drawer of the bill. [d.
55 See, e.g., Witherly v. Sarsfield, 1 Shower, K.B. 125,89 Eng. Rep. 491 (Exch. Ch. 1686).
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in Bristol had funds in the hands of his factor in London,' and
needed to make a payment to someone else in London, the Bristol
merchant could do so by drawing a bill on his London factor,
payable to his London creditor. The London creditor, as payee,
could simply present the bill to the drawee and receive payment.
No transfer or indorsement would be involved, but the bill would.
have served an essential role as a payment mechanism.56
To be sure, bills were commonly transferred, but the charac-
teristic of transferability is perhaps best understood not as an end
in itself, but as a mechanism by which bills could be used to enable
a merchant to make use of funds in the hands of correspondents
in distant locations. For example, a Bristol merchant might be able
to make a payment to his creditor in Bristol by giving him a bill
drawn on his factor in London: the creditor would be willing to
accept such a payment whether or not he had immediate need of
funds in London, because he knew that many other people would
have need of funds in London. The well-known case of Peacock v.
Rhodes57 is a perfect example. Rhodes, in Halifax in western York-
shire, drew a bill on his London bankers payable to Ingham or
order.58 The bill passed through several hands before being stolen
from Joseph Fisher at York, about forty miles northeast of Halifax.
We next find the bill forty miles further to the northeast at the
coastal port of Scarborough where a mercer took it in payment for
cloth. From Scarborough the bill presumably was sent down to
London by the regular coastal shipping routes, but was dishonored
by the London bankers. Thus, from the bare facts of the report we
can literally trace the physical path of the bill through a series of
transfers closer and closer to the drawee.59
56 For example, in Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cow. 271 (N.Y. 1827) a Virginia farmer travelled
to New York to sell his crop of wheat. The buyer paid by giving the farmer a bill drawn on
their correspondent in Richmond, which the farmer took back with him when he returned
home. The issue in the case was whether the drawer had been discharged by the payee's
delay in presenting the bill for acceptance.
57 2 DougI. 633, 99 Eng. Rep. 402 (K.B. 1781). Peacock v. Rhodes is well-known only
because it, unlike most cases about bills in the classic era, did involve a question of the sort
that modern lawyers have assumed to be the universal concern of that era. Lord Mansfield
ruled in the case that once a bill payable to order had been indorsed in blank, a bona fide
purchaser could get good title even though the bill had been stolen. ld. at 403.
58 The report identifies the drawee only as "Smith, Payne, and Smith:' ld. at 402. That
firm was a well known London banking firm, established in 1758 to serve as the London
correspondents of a Nottingham banking house. L.S. PRESSNELL, COUNTRY BANKING IN THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 105-09 (1956).
59 In Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159, 129 Eng. Rep. 64 (C.P. 1816), we can follow the
...
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V. WHY NEGOTIABILITY WASN'T IMPORTANT
Once we understand the characteristic transactions of the clas-
sical era, it becomes easier to understand why the concept of ne-
gotiability, in the sense of freedom from claims and defenses, seems
not to have played a particularly significant role in the law of bills
and notes.
In the first place, the form of many bill transactions in the
classical era was such that the defenses familiar to twentieth century
lawyers would commonly not arise. Twentieth century lawyers have
assumed that in the typical bill transaction, the person responsible
for paying the bill (the drawee-acceptor) incurred his obligation on
it for the purchase price of goods sold to him. Accordingly, it is
possible that he will resist payment of the bill on the basis ofdefenses
arising out of the sale. Undoubtedly transactions of that form oc-
curred in the classical era, and they may have even become the rule
by the middle of the nineteenth century.60 Nonetheless, in the era
in which the commission merchant system played a major role in
the distribution of goods, many bills would arise out of a somewhat
different form of transaction. A merchant might draw on his factor
to make use of the funds in the factor's hands from the sale of the
principal's goods, or on a banking house that had agreed to accept
his bills as a form of finance. The obligation of the drawee-acceptor
on the bill in such transactions was not an embodiment of a buyer's
obligation to pay for goods purchased on credit. Rather, it was either
a factor's obligation to remit collected funds to his principal, or a
merchant banker's obligation to honor the commitment made when
it accepted the bill. In such cases, it is hardly surprising that we do
not see disputes about breach of warranty and other sales defenses
that the traditional legal history leads us to expect.
To the extent that the treatises of the classical era do cover the
question whether a holder is subject to consideration defenses, the
focus is not the failure of consideration or breach of warranty
defenses that figure so prominently in the twentieth century works.
Rather the points discussed are usually illegality of consideration,
mostly usury and gambling issues, and want of consideration.61 The
path of a bill in international commerce. The bill was drawn in London on a house in Lisbon.
The payee indorsed it to a firm in Paris, who indorsed to a firm in Genoa, who had it
presented to the drawee in Lisbon. [d.
60 See, e.g.,j.S. GIBBONS, THE BANKS OF NEW YORK 214-15 (1859).
61 See, e.g., S. KYD, supra note 11, at 276 (2d Amer. ed. 1800) ("Beside the different
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want of consideration defense discussed in the treatises was quite
different from anything we would put under that heading today.
The example invariably given of want of consideration defense that
would not be available against a remote party is that an acceptor
who had received no value for his acceptance would still be liable
to a holder for value, even if the holder knew that the acceptor had
received no value.52 The situation contemplated by such discussions
is that someone needing to raise money found that he could not do
so on his own credit. Accordingly, the borrower found someone
willing to act as his surety, implementing the arrangement by draw-
ing a bill on the surety who accepted it even though he held no
funds due to the drawer. The bill could then be discounted more
readily. To say that the acceptor cannot defend in such cases on the
basis of "want of consideration" means only that a person who has
accepted a bill as an accommodation to the drawer is bound by that
acceptance. Indeed, today that point would not even be described
as a matter of want of consideration; rather, we would say that the
consideration given to the borrower is sufficient consideration for
the surety's promise as well. Thus, to the extent that the classical
era treatises say anything about the point that the defense of want
of consideration cannot be raised against bona fide purchasers, they
are saying nothing more than that a surety's engagement is enforce-
able despite the fact that the surety himself did not receive anything
from the creditor.
Although the circumstances uf bill transactions in the classical
era shed some light on the puzzling absence of discussion in the
classical era of the sale of goods defenses that modern lawyers
assume to be so significant, this cannot be a full explanation.
Whether or not it was the archetypal bill transaction, it was certainly
not unknown for a bill to be issued for a price of goods sold on
credit.53 Moreover, if a bill had been circulated as a medium of
payment, an indorser might well incur his obligation on it in con-
nection with the purchase of goods. Why then do we see no discus-
subjects of defense which may be collected from the general principles laid down in the
preceding chapters, the most usual are those which arise either from the total want of
consideration, or from the illegality of the consideration for which the bill or note was
given.").
62 See, e.g., J. BYLES, supra note 13, at 38; J. CHtITY, supra note 12, at 51-52; S. Kyo,
supra note 11, at 276-77.
63 See, e.g., Tye v. Gwynne, 2 Campb. 346, 170 Eng. Rep. 1179 (Lord Ellenborough at
nisi prius 1809).
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sion at all in the classical era of the point that modern lawyers have
assumed to be central to the law of bills and notes?
The traditional legal history of the law of bills and notes as-
sumes that in an action between the immediate parties to an instru-
ment, one who had given the bill in exchange for goods sold to him
could resist payment of his obligation on the bill by raising problems
with the goods. That assumption is an anachronism. Today it seems
so obvious that a buyer sued for the price of goods can raise disputes
about the quality of the goods as a defense that it is easy to forget
that this is largely a product of procedural developments of the
nineteenth century. Even as a matter of basic contract doctrine, the
case traditionally cited as establishing the principle that one sued
on a contract can defend on the grounds of the inadequacy of the
other's performance is Basten v. Butter, decided in 1806.64 At best,
the doctrine dates back to Lord Mansfield's decision in Boone v. Eyre,
in 1779.65 Moreover, even after disputes about the quality of goods
became available as defenses in general contract actions, the defense
was not available when the buyer had given a bill or note for the
price. As Chief Justice Tenterden put it in an 1830 decision,
the cases ... have completely established the distinction
between an action for the price of goods, and an action
on the security given for them. In the former, the value
only can be recovered;_ in the latter ... the party holding
bills given for the price of goods supplied can recover
upon them, unless there has been a total failure of con-
sideration. If the consideration fails partially, as by the
inferiority of the article furnished to that ordered, the
buyer must seek his remedy by a cross action.66
It was not until the procedural developments of the late nineteenth
century concerning set-off and counterclaim,67 that one who had
given a bill or note for goods was able to defend on grounds of
breach of warranty or the like. Thus, the problem for which ne-
54 7 East 480, 103 Eng. Rep. 185 (K.B. 1806).
65 1 H. Bl. 273n, 126 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1779).
66 Obbard v. Betham, M. & M. 483,173 Eng. Rep. 1232, 1232, (Tenterden, C.]. at nisi
prius 1830). Accord, Tye v. Gwynne, 2 Campb. 346, 170 Eng. Rep. 1179 (Lord Ellenborough
at nisi prius 1809); Morgan v. Richardson, 1 Campb. 40n, (Lord Ellenborough at nisi prius).
67 In English law, it was not until the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873, 36 &
37 Vict. c. 66, that counterclaims became generally available in actions in the common law
courts.
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gotiability is assumed to be the solution did not develop until well
after the period that the law of bills and notes became settled.
At the most fundamental level, however, the explanation of the
unimportance of negotiability in the classical era lies in an anach-
ronism of a different sort. The problems addressed by the concept
of. negotiability are questions about the rights of holders of instru-
ments against persons who unquestionably are obligated on the
instrument, and who are worth suing. The central problem is
whether the solvent obligor can raise defenses. In the classical era,
however, such problems were, as a practical matter, overshadowed
by far more important questions; specifically, what happens when
the person expected to pay becomes insolvent. The law of bills and
notes in the classical era had to deal with a world in which payments
were routinely made by transfer of instruments that might ulti-
mately not be paid at all, due to the insolvency of the obligor. Faced
with problems of that level of severity, the question whether some
solvent obligor might have some sort of defense pales into insignif-
Icance.
VI. MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES IN THE
CLASSICAL ERA
The facts of a case such as Peacock v. Rhodes illustrate one of
the central aspects of the payment system of the classical era: a bill
might circulate for a considerable period of time before it was
known whether the drawee would pay it. In such a case as Peacock,
the bill might have circulated through many hands before it was
even presented to the drawee for acceptance, so that the parties
would not even have the benefit of the drawee's contractual obli-
gation. Even after a bill was accepted, there remained the risk that
the acceptor might become insolvent before the bill came due. The
parties through whose hands the bill passed, however, were acting
on the assumption that the drawee would ultimately pay the bill.
They might, to be sure, have relied on the credit of prior parties
to back up the bill, but the assumption governing the usual case
would be that the drawee would pay the bill. If the drawee failed
or for some other reason dishonored the bill, then all of the prior
payment transactions effected by transfer of the bill might be un-
settled as holders of the bill sought recourse against prior parties
on their liability as indorsers or drawer. Many of the major legal
issues presented by the payment system of the classical era arose
out of this phenomenon.
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A. Acceptance
The concept of acceptance plays very little role in present day
commercial law.68 In the classical era of bills and notes, however,
acceptance was an everyday matter, and legal issues about accep-
tance were quite important. Because the whole point of bills was to
make use of funds in another's hands as a medium of payment, the
critical question for the holder of the bill was whether the drawee
would agree to pay the bill, that is, accept. Thus, it is hardly sur-
prising that issues about acceptance were matters of major concern.
Indeed, one of the striking points that emerges from a com-
parison of the legal treatises on bills and notes in the classical era
and those of the twentieth century is the prominence given to
acceptance issues. In a typical bills treatise of the late eighteenth or
early nineteenth century, the chapter on acceptance is a major part
of the book. In the first edition of Bayley, for example, the chapter
on acceptance accounts for about one-fourth of the discussion of
the substantive law of bills and notes.69 By contrast, acceptance had
become a minor issue in the books of the early twentieth century,
and goes essentially unmentioned in most books of the late twentieth
century.70
1. Acceptance and the Commission Agent System
Many of the disputed issues about acceptance of bills grew out
of the tension between the desirability of requiring a simple and
swift answer to the question whether the drawee would pay and the
68 One of the few remnants of acceptance in modern law is certification of checks. See
U.C.C. § 3-411. Even that practice is becoming increasingly uncommon because certified
checks are something of a nuisance in modern automated check processing.
69 The first edition of Bayley was a small book, having only six chapters totalling seventy
pages of principal text. Of this, the last two chapters, from pages forty-two to seventy dealt
with procedure and evidence in actions on bills. Thus only the first four chapters, pages one
to forty-one, dealt with substantive questions, of which one chapter of ten pages covered
acceptance.
70 The twentieth century hornbooks illustrate quite clearly the withering of acceptance
issues. In the first edition of Bigelow's hornbook, M.M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF THE LAw OF
BILLS, NOTES, AND CHEQUES 2-3 (1893), acceptance accounts for only ten pages of a 255
page work, about four percent. In the last standard hornbook on bills and notes, W.E.
BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES (1943), acceptance is treated in only
twenty-four pages of a 1,129 page book, about -two percent. In the currently dominant
hornbook on the U.C.C., J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980) acceptance is treated in less than one page, and
the passage consists entirely of paraphrase and quotation of the Code sections with no case
citations or discussion at all.
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need to take account of the practical realities of the merchant-factor
relationship out of which bill transactions arose. Indeed, as is the
case with many of the significant issues of the classical law of bills
and notes, disputes about acceptance are nearly incomprehensible
unless one realizes that the commission agent system of distribution
was the characteristic commercial transaction of this era.
For example, it was well established that a drawee to whom a
bill was presented should be given twenty-four hours to decide
whether to accept, the rationale being that the drawee would need
the "opportunity of examining into the accounts between himself
and the drawer" in order to decide "whether he has effects of the
drawer's in his hands."71 That explanation makes perfect sense if
the transaction is one in which a merchant draws on his commission
agent. On the other hand, if the characteristic transaction were as
assumed by the twentieth century writers, then it should have been
a far simpler matter for the drawee to decide whether to accept,
for the bill would have been drawn for the purchase price of a
specific shipment of goods to the drawee. Indeed, the language that
is invariably used in describing the relationship between drawer and
drawee-that the drawer had "effects in the hands of the drawee"-
seems an extremely odd method of expression if what was being
described was the drawee's obligation as buyer to pay the purchase
price of goods bought from the drawer. On the other hand, it is an
entirely natural means of expression if the classic transaction is that
the drawer is drawing a bill on his factor for funds that the factor
collected from the sale of goods on the drawer's account.72
More telling still are the issues about qualified and partial ac-
ceptances. After some dispute, it was eventually settled that a
drawee to whom a bill was presented might make his acceptance
conditional on certain events, or might accept the bill only to a
certain amount.73 For example, in Smith v. Abbott, the drawee ac-
71 J. CHIllY, supra note 12, at 70, 72.
72 The tie between the law of bills and the merchant-factor relationship was even clearer
in some other jurisdictions, as is illustrated by Burrows v. Jemino, 2 Str. 733, 93 Eng. Rep.
815 (Ch. 1727), in which a bill "was drawn upon the plaintiff at Leghorn, which he accepted:
but by the law there, if a bill be accepted and the drawer fails, and the acceptor hath not
sufficient effects of the drawer in his hands at the time of the acceptance, the acceptance
becomes void." The acceptor obtained a judgment vacating his acceptance in an action in
the Leghorn courts and, upon returning to England and being sued on his acceptance,
obtained an injunction against the suit on the basis of the Leghorn decree. Id. at 815.
73 J. BAYLEY, supra note 10, at 22-23; J. CHIllY, supra note 12, at 74-82; S. KYD, supra
note II, at 74:-80. The holder presenting the bill would have the option of treating that as
dishonor and protesting, but if the holder did go along with the qualified or partial accep·
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cepted a bill "to pay it when the goods consigned to him, and for
which the bill was drawn, were sold."74 The goods were, in fact,
sold, but the drawee refused to pay. In the action against the drawee
on his acceptance, it was argued that the uncertainty of such a
qualified acceptance should prevent it from having the usual effect
of binding the acceptor to an action on the bill. The argument,
though, was rejected, on the grounds that "it will affect trade, if
factors are not allowed to use this caution, when bills are drawn
before they have an opportunity to dispose of the goods."75
The problem of partial acceptances was even more difficult. In
Wegersloffe v. Keene,76 a merchant residing in Norway drew a bill for
£ 127 on an English merchant. Upon presentment, the drawee
checked his accounts, and finding that he had only £ 100 due to
the drawer, wrote on the bill that he would accept it only for £ 100.
Upon the drawee's failure to pay even the £ 100, the holder brought
suit on the bill for the £ 100. The drawee was represented by John
Strange, a young lawyer who was to have a distinguished career in
the following decades.77 Strange admitted that the undertaking
might have the effect of a simple contract, but argued forcefully
that it should not be regarded as giving rise to liability on the bill
itself. The heart of Strange's argument was that tolerating partial
acceptances would greatly confuse bill transactions and impair the
circulation of bills, because it might result in a situation where the
drawer or indorsers could face liability to several persons for dif-
ferent parts of the debt.78
tance, it would bind the drawee if the condition did occur or to the extent of the partial
acceptance. J. ByLES, supra note 13, at 7l.
74 2 Str. 1152,93 Eng. Rep. 1095, 1095,7 Mod. 426, 87 Eng. Rep. 1334 (K.B. 1741).
Similarly, in Sproat v. Matthews, 1 T.R. 182, 99 Eng. Rep. 1041 (K.B. 1786), a London
merchant to whom a bill was presented for acceptance told the holder that the bill had been
drawn against a cargo that the drawer had consigned to either him or another merchant in
Bristol, so that he could accept only on the condition that the goods came to him.
75 Id.
76 1 Str. 214, 93 Eng. Rep. 480 (K.B. 1719).
77 Id. Strange had been called to the bar only a year before, in 1718. In later years he
held office as king's counsel, solicitor general, recorder of London, and master of the rolls.
78
The great benefit arising to the public[k] from these bills is, their being nego-
tiable and passing about as well as money, for every body is sensible, that without
the assistance of these bills our trade could never be carried on for want of
sufficient specie; not to mention the trouble and danger in returning money,
which is avoided by this expedient. It is this benefit which the public[k] receives
from these bills, that has [i]entitled them to all the favour they have received,
of which innumerable instances might be given .... Now if what is contended
for on the other side should prevail, the public[k] will be deprived of this great
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Thus, the court faced a dilemma. Merchants acting as commis-
sion agents might easily find themselves in the situation of the
drawee in Wegersloffe, and want to accept only to the extent of the
funds they held for the drawer. Accommodating that need, how-
'ever, would conflict with the objective of facilitating the system of
bill ,circulation. Modern lawyers, familiar with the traditional ac-
counts of the history and purposes of negotiable instruments, would
have no difficulty guessing how that conflict would be resolved-
Strange's argument should win hands down. The case, though,
came out the other way. Evidently, eighteenth century judges did
not see the choice between the needs of the actual transactions that
gave rise to bills and the theoretical advantages of facilitating cir-
culation in the way that later generations have assumed was central
to the law of bills and notes.79
2. Acceptance Financing
The acceptance of a bill of exchange is a form of credit trans-
action even in the simplest bill transaction where a merchant ships
goods to his commission agent and draws a bill on the agent for the
proceeds of the sale. To the extent that the drawer can obtain
immediate value for the bill from someone before the drawee is
called upon to pay it, the bill is being used as a credit device in
addition to its role as a payment medium. The credit aspect of bills
becomes even more prominent if the factor is willing to allow the
merchant to draw a bill in advance of the factor's sale of the goods.
If the factor's credit is good enough that the merchant will be able
to sell that bill to someone else, then the factor, by lending his credit
to the drawer, is effectively providing financing to the drawer for
the sale of the goods.
This aspect of bill of exchange transactions became very sig-
nificant in Dutch commercial practice in the eighteenth century.so
The merchants ofAmsterdam rose to dominance in European trade
in the seventeenth century on the basis of their role as commission
benefit; for no man will take this bill as so much money in the way of trade,
when he is to resort to one man for one part, and perhaps send out of the
kingdom for the other, to a place where he has no correspondent.
Id. at 482-83.
79 Although the report gives Strange's argument at length, there is relatively little account
of the argument on the other side or reasons given by the judges-not surprising given that
Strange was the reporter!
80 See generally C. WILSON, ANGLO-DUTCH COMMERCE AND FINANCE IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY (1941).
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sales agents. Initially, the Amsterdam merchants actually did act as
commission sales agents for the traffic in goods. Goods from all
over Europe, and indeed, the world, were shipped to Amsterdam
and resold there. Gradually, however, the role of the Amsterdam
merchants shifted to pure finance.81 Although the legal description
of principal and agent calls to mind a picture in which the principal
is the major actor and the agent a mere instrumentality, the eco-
nomic realities could be quite the opposite. The merchants of Am-
sterdam who acted as commission agents for other merchants
throughout the world were often far wealthier, credit worthy, and
powerful than their "principals." Accordingly, a merchant whose
own credit would have counted for little might well find a ready
market for his bills of -exchange if he drew on an Amsterdam
merchant who regularly accepted his bills. This form of finance
growing out of the commission sales system spread throughout the
world and remained the dominant method of finance until well into
the nineteenth century. Such transactions were the bread and butter
of the business of the great merchant banking houses of Amsterdam
and London in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.82
Many of the controversial issues of the law of bills of exchange
in the classical era grew out of the circumstances of this pattern of
bill finance. Perhaps the clearest example is the lengthy dispute
over the issue of "virtual" and "extrinsic" acceptances.83 In the bill
finance transactions of the sort just described, the bill commonly
played its principal credit role before it actually arrived at the
drawee for acceptance. Thus, if an American cotton exporter was
known to be a customer of a leading English merchant banking
81 Conservative merchants and public officials in Amsterdam generally frowned on the
transformation of the Amsterdam merchants from goods merchants into pure finance houses,
believing it important to the prosperity of Amsterdam that the goods actually pass through
the Amsterdam warehouses. Even aside from such concerns of public economic policy, a
merchant banking house might well want to insure that it received the commission sales
business as well as the acceptance business, for the commission earned on the sale of the
goods generally exceeded the commission earned for accepting bilk For example, the great
nineteenth century merchant banking firm, the Barings, made it an important part of their
policy to see to it that they got the commission on the sale of goods as well as the commission
on the acceptance of bills arising out of the. shipment of the goods. See R. HIDY, THE HOUSE
OF BARING IN AMERICAN TRADE AND FINANCE (1949).
82 See N.S. BUCK, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION OF ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE
1800-1850, at 12-14 and passim (1925); R. HIDY, supra note 81, at 131-33. .
83 In the jargon of nineteenth century bills law, "extrinsic acceptance" referred to a
collateral written undertaking to accept a bill already in existence, while "virtual acceptance"
referred to the doctrine, adopted in America but not England, that a promise to accept bills
to be drawn in the future could operate as an acceptance of those bills.
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house, such as the Barings, and the Barings regularly accepted his
bills, then he would be able to obtain financing in America by
discounting the bills he drew on the Barings. The critical point,
however, was that others in the local community knew that the
American merchant was entitled to draw on the Barings. Thus, to
facilitate the operations of the American merchant, the Barings
might, in one form or another, have let it be known that he was
entitled to draw on' them, or, at the extreme, might have made a
specific promise to accept specific bills that he drew.84 Such under-
takings seem to have been common in mercantile practice from an
early date, for the seventeenth century works on mercantile affairs
include discussions of such letters of credit.85 In the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, precise specification of the effect of
such undertakings became a major issue of controversy in English
and American law.
In 1765, King's Bench, under Lord Mansfield, held in the
famous case of Pillans v. Van Mierop,86 that an action would lie on a
promise to accept a bill. The opinions do not clearly indicate
whether the action was thought to be a contractual action for breach
of the promise to accept, or whether the promise was treated as an
acceptance itself, rendering the drawee liable on the bill. The dis-
tinction could be quite significant, aside from the differences in
proof required, in that subsequent holders of the bill would have
an action against the drawee if the promise amounted to an accep-
tance, but might have difficulty enforcing the undertaking if it
operated only as a promise-running in favor of another-to accept
the bill.87 English decisions after Pillans established that a promise
to accept bills to be drawn would not be treated as an acceptance
itself,88 although a promise to accept a bill that had already been
drawn could operate as an acceptance.89 American courts, however,
84 R. HIDY, supra note 81, at 136-37.
85 E.g., MALYNES, LEX MERCATORIA 76-77 (3d ed. 1685).
88 3 Burr. 1663,97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
87 The problems posed by the English decisions for the letter of credit and similar
devices were not overcome until a century after Pitlans; when it was held that although
nothing but a writing on the bill could count as an acceptance, a promise to accept bills was
enforceable as a contractual undertaking even by later holders of the bills drawn under it.
In re Agra and Masterman's Bank, 2 Ch. App. 391 (1867);
88 Bank of Ireland v. Archer & Daly, 11 M. & W. 383, 152 Eng. Rep. 852 (K.B. 1843);
johnson v. Collings, 1 East 98, 102 Eng. Rep. 40 (1800).
89 Clarke v. Cock, 4 East 57, 102 Eng. Rep. 751 (1803). Subsequent English legislation,
,however, required that acceptances be written on the bill itself. Regulation of Acceptance
Act, 1821, 1 & 2 Geo. 4, ch. 78, § 2.
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generally held that a promise to accept bills not yet drawn could
render the drawee liable as acceptor of bills later drawn under the
promise.90
This now seemingly arcane dispute over "virtual acceptances,"
was, at the time, a matter of major commercial significance. For
example, in 1837 the Bank of England decided to tighten up money
and credit by, among other things, refusing financial accommoda-
tion to three major British merchant banking firms, T. Wiggin &
Co., T. Wilson & Co. and George Wildes & Co., that had extensive
dealings in the finance ofAmerican trade. The three firms promptly
failed, with the result that some eight to ten million dollars worth
of bills of exchange drawn by American merchants on the British
houses were returned dishonored, setting off a chain of bankrupt-
cies among American cotton exporters and other merchants.91 Many
of the protested bills had been drawn under some form of letter of
credit or other assurance of acceptance, giving rise to extensive
litigation in the American courts about whether the British houses
were bound either as acceptors or for breach of a promise to ac-
cept.92
B. Dishonor
In late twentieth century payment system law, the basic as-
sumption is that things usually do not go wrong. For example,
because well over ninety-nine percent of all checks are paid, the
check collection system works on the theory that we can assume that
checks will be paid and establish'special procedures for the excep-
tional cases.93 By contrast, in the classical era of the law of bills and
notes, instruments that had circulated as payment media frequently
were dishonored, and the law of-bills and notes was at every point
designed with a careful eye toward the likelihood of dishonor.
1. Plight of Those Called Upon to Make Good Dishonored Bills
Any payment system based on the transfer of debts must deal
with one fundamental question: If a debtor pays his creditor by
90 Coolidge v. Payson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 66, 75 (1817).
91 The episode is briefly described in B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA
457-62 (1957) and W. B. SMITH, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES 186-88 (1953).
92 See, e.g., Russell v. Wiggin, 21 F. Cas. 68 (C.C.D. Ma. 1842) (No. 12,165) (Story, ].);
Wildes v. Savage, 29 F. Cas. 1226 (C.C.D. Ma. 1839) (No. 17,653) (Story,].).
93 See Rogers, The Irrelevance ofNegotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law ofthe Check-Based
Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REv. 929, 943-45 (1987).
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transferring to him a debt due from a third party, is the debtor
discharged or does he remain obligated in the event that the third
party fails to pay the transferred debt? In the classical era of the
law of bills and notes, this issue arose in two settings.
First, there were cases involving bank notes and checks, payable
on demand. By the mid- to late- seventeenth century, it became
common in London to make payment by directing one's banker, or,
in the earlier stages, goldsmith, to transfer funds held on deposit
to the creditor.94 Various instruments were used, some in the form
of notes issued by the banker payable to bearer and others in the
form of drafts on the banker directing payment to the creditor.95
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the courts began to see
many cases in which a debtor gave his creditor such an instrument,
but the banker failed between the time the instrument was given
and the time it was presented.96 In Ward v. Evans,97 Chief Justice
Holt laid down the basic rule:
I am of the opinion, and always was (notwithstanding the
noise and cry, that it is the use of Lombard-Street, as if
the contrary opinion would blow up Lombard-Street) that
the acceptance of such a note is not actual payment ....
For when such a note is given in payment, it is always
intended to be taken under this condition, to be payment
if the money be paid thereon in convenient time. This
note was demanded within convenient time, but if the
party who takes the note, keep it by him for several days
without demanding it, and the person who ought to pay
it becomes insolvent, he that received it must bear the loss,
because he prevented the other person from receiving the
money by detaining the note in his custody.98
As Holt's caustic remark about Lombard ~treet opinion suggests,
this is an issue on which there might be considerable controversy.
94 See R.D. RICHARDS, THE EARLY HISTORY OF BANKING IN ENGLAND 23-64 (1929).
95 According to Chitty, in London the check form of instrument had largely displaced
the note form by the time that he wrote, 1799, although notes were still commonly issued
by country bankers. J. CHITTY, supra note 12, at 170-71.
96 Holme v. Barry, 1 Str. 422, 93 Eng. Rep. 605 (K.B. 1720); Mekkish v. Rawdon, 2
Moore & Scott 570 (K.B. 1720); Moore v. Warren, 1 Str. 415, 93 Eng. Rep. 605 (K.B. 1720);
Turner v. Mead, 1 Str. 416,93 Eng. Rep. 606 (K.B. 1720); Crawley v. Crowther, Freem. Chy.
257,22 Eng. Rep. 1194 (Ch. 1703); Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym 928;92 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B.
1702); Phillips v. Phillips, 2 Freem. Chy. 247, 22 Eng. Rep. 1188 (Ch. 1700); Hill v. Lewis, 1
Salk. 131,91 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B. 1693).
97 2 Ld. Raym 928, 92 Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1702).
98 [d. at 121.
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On one side, treating such notes as only conditional payment may
hinder their use, because the debtor could not be certain that the
affair was closed. Yet, it is equally possible that the opposite rule
may discourage use of bankers' notes, because creditors would be
less willing to accept them if they lost all recourse against the debtor.
In any event, history suggests that Holt's intuitions were right, for
it remains the rule today that taking a check generally does not
extinguish the underlying debt.99
Second, there were cases involving ordinary bills of exchange
or notes. Where a debtor gave such an instrument, he would almost
always remain liable, for he would incur liability on the bill itself.
Either the debtor would make payment by drawing a bill on some-
one who held his funds and give it to the creditor, in which case he
was liable on the bill as drawer, or he would make payment by
transferring a bill drawn by another, in which case he would ordi-
narily have to indorse the bill and so incur liability on it. In theory,
one transferring such an instrument might have avoided liability on
it, either by transferring it without indorsement if it had already
been indorsed in blank, or by indorsing it without recourse. In
practice, however, it was unlikely that a creditor would accept the
bill that way, because a refusal to indorse would suggest that the
debtor himself was suspicious about the soundness of the bill. loO
One of the main reasons that bills were an acceptable medium of
exchange was that the accumulation of indorsements added security
to the bill. As the saying went, the more indorsements, the better
the bill. lOl •
99 If, however, a bearer instrument was given at the time of the original contract, rather
than as payment of a pre-existing debt, Holt suggested that taking the note would discharge
the debt. "I agree ... that taking a note for goods sold is a payment, because it was part of
the original contract; but paper is no payment where there is a precedent debt." [d. That
distinction was followed in subsequent English cases. See, e.g., Cambridge v. Allenby, 6 Barn.
& Cress_ 373, 108 Eng. Rep. 489 (1827), and adopted in section 58 of the 1887 Bills of
Exchange Act. The nineteenth century American decisions on the matter were in considerable
disarray, see generally, 2 T. PARSONS, PROMISSORY NoTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 150-207
(1863), and the Negotiable Instruments Law did not cover the issue, other than the provision
in N.I.L. § 65(4) that one who negotiates an instrument by delivery warrants that he has no
knowledge of any fact that would render it worthless. The D.C.C. draws no distinction
between instruments given for pre-existing debts and those given at the time of the contract;
rather, § 3·802 provides that taking an instrument does not amount to a discharge except
where a bank is obligated on the instrument.
100 According to Parsons, it became common in nineteenth century American cities for
notes to be made payable to the maker himself and indorsed by him in blank, so that the
notes could then be transferred by others without having either to indorse or indorse. without
recourse. 1 T. PARSONS, PROMISSORY NoTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE 17 (1863).
101 See Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669, 97 Eng. Rep. 503, 507 (K.B. 1759) (Mansfield,
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Accustomed as we are today to modern payment systems, it is
hard for us fully to appreciate the consequence of the principle that
the drawer and indorsers of a bill are liable in the event of non-
payment by the drawee. In the commercial world of the eighteenth
century, any merchant would regularly have to take bills as a form
of payment, because frequently no other payment medium was
available. Then, in order to pass on the bills, the merchant would
be called upon to indorse them. Though the merchant might well
have considered any 'such specific transaction closed long ago, any
indorser through whose hands the bill had passed might find him-
self called upon to pay it months later as a result of the failure of
some other merchant, perhaps wholly unknown to him. For ex-
ample, in 1795 an ambitious young Tennessee man travelled to
Philadelphia where he sold some land to.a Philadelphia merchant,
taking the latter's note as payment. In turn, he bought goods, paying
by indorsing over the note, and returned to Tennessee intending
to set up business as a general merchant with the stock purchased
in Philadelphia. Shortly after returning to Tennessee, however, the
young man-one Andrew Jackson-learned that the Philadelphia
merchant had failed, and Jackson was forced to pay the note,
thereby losing the great bulk of his fortune. 102
The plight of indorsers called upon to honor bills that had
passed through their hands explains a great deal of the law of bills
and notes. Consider, for example, all of the rules about such matters
as the precise time for payment that drearily occupy the first few
chapters of most law books on the subject. If a bill is drawn payable
six days after sight, does the day of sight count as one of the SiX?103
Are "days of grace" allowed on promissory notes as well as bills of
exchange?104 If the date for payment is a Sunday or holiday, does
the bill become due on the day before or the day after?105 Does
commencement day at Harvard College count as a holiday in Mas-
sachusetts?106 Why would anyone spend money to have lawyers
argue about such things if the dispute were with the principal
obligor? Why not just wait until Tuesday to file suit rather than
C.J.) ("In common experience every body knows that the more indorsements a bill has, the
greater credit it bears.")
102 J.S. BASSETT, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 34 (1931); M. JAMES, THE LIFE OF
ANDREW JACKSON 74-78 (1938); 1 J. PARTON, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 242-44 (1860).
103 Coleman v. Sayer, 1 Barn. 303, 94 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1728).
ICH Brown v. Harraden, 4 T.R. 148, 100 Eng. Rep. 943 (K.B. 1791).
105 Tassell v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym 743, 91 Eng. Rep. 1397 (K.B. 1695).
lOG City Bank v. Cutter, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 414 (1826).
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worrying about whether you could have sued on Monday? The
answer, of course, is that the disputes that gave rise to so many of
the picayune rules that fill the books on bills and notes were not
suits against the principal obligor, but efforts by the holder of a
dishonored bill to collect it from an indorser or drawer. Once the
economic context is understood t it becomes obvious that the arcana
of classical era bills and notes law were produced not by mindless
pettifoggery but by the understandable desperation of people facing
the prospect of financial ruin when called on to honor bills that
may have passed ~hrough their hands months before in long-for-
gotten transactions. I07
There was, though, no satisfactory solution to the cases pres-
enting wrenching stories of human distress that came before the
courts when indorsers or drawers were called upon to make good
dishonored bills. If sympathy for indorsers and drawers too greatly
influenced the rules about procedure on dishonor, other problems
would develop. Consider the situation of a holder of a bill when it
appeared that the drawee might refuse to accept, or, having ac-
cepted, might be unable to pay. If it was completely clear that the
drawee would not pay, the holder should certainly proceed
promptly with the necessary steps to preserve rights against prior
parties. The difficulty, though, came in cases where the drawee's
failure to pay was less clearly anticipated. A holder who expected
payment by the drawee might be lulled into a false sense of security
and omit to take all the steps necessary to preserve his rights against
prior parties. Even if the holder realized that there was some ques-
tion about whether .the drawee would pay, he faced a dilemma if
the drawee equivocated. Should he immediately give notice of dis-
honor and proceed against prior parties, thereby incurring the
inconvenience and expense of protest, notary fees, and lawsuits, or
should he hold off for a short while in the hopes that the drawee
would pay, thereby risking loss of his rights against prior parties on
the grounds that by giving credit to the drawee he had discharged
prior parties?I08 The more rigorous the rules about steps necessary
to preserve rights against prior parties, the more difficult it would
107 Indeed, an indorser who paid without quibbling might have been thought unusually
honest. For example, Andrew Jackson did pay the notes of the failed Philadelphia merchant,
which so impressed bankers of the era that in his later years it was said that jackson's
indorsement was better security than that of men ten times richer than he. See J. PARTON,
supra note 102, at 249-50. .
108 Tindal v. Brown, 1 T.R. 167, 99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786), discussed at text
accompanying note 115, infra, is a perfect illustration of the problem.
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become for holders to make sensible arrangements in trying to get
the bills paid by the principal obligor.
2. Disputes Between Judges and Juries Over Rules on Dishonor
One manifestation of the intractable problems presented in
actions against indorsers and drawers of dishonored bills was the
controversy over the role of the jury in disputes about the time for
presentment and notice of dishonor. As Lord Holt had observed in
Ward v. Evans, one who had paid a debt with a note issued by a
banker or goldsmith who subsequently failed might be able to es-
cape liability to his creditor by arguing that the creditor had not
acted diligently in presenting the note for payment. Similarly, in
the case of ordinary bills, the holder was required to give notice of
dishonor to prior parties, and would lose his rights of recourse by
undue delay in giving notice. All of the conflict inherent in the
plight of those who found themselves called on to make good an-
other's failure were played out in the evolution of the rules on
presentment and notice of dishonor.
In the first place, we see the tension manifested in the rationales
given for the rule that a holder's failure to act diligently discharged
prior parties. The earliest cases of discharge for want of timely
notice of dishonor were generally actions against the drawers of
ordinary bills, and the original rationale for the rule turned on the
circumstances of the characteristic bill transaction in which a mer-
chant drew on his factor for amounts due him for goods sold on
commission. If the holder delayed for a long period in presenting
the bill, or if the bill was dishonored but the drawer was not notified,
then the drawer might in the meantime settle his accounts with his
factor on the assumption that the bill had been paid, or continue
to do business with the factor not realizing that he was defaulting
on his obligations. As Chief Justice Treby of Common Pleas put it
in a 1699 decision, "it may be prejudicial to commerce if a bill may
rise up to charge the drawer at any distance of time, when, in the
meantime, all reckonings are adjusted between the drawer and
drawee."109 On that rationale, one might think that the holder
109 Allen v. Dundas, 1 Salk. 127, 100 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1789); accord, Darrach v.
Savage, 1 Show. 155, 89 Eng. Rep. 509, Holt 113, 90 Eng. Rep. 961 (1691); Mogadara v.
Holt, 12 Mod. 15, 88 Eng. Rep. 1134, Holt 113,90 Eng. Rep. 961, 1 Show. 317, 89 Eng.
Rep. 597 (K.B. 1691). By the end of the eighteenth century, the standard form of expression
was that the drawer should be given notice so that he may withdraw his effects from the
drawee. See Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T.R. 405, 410, 99 Eng. Rep. 1164, 1167 (K.B. 1786)
(Buller, J.).
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should be able to argue that in a particular case the drawer was not
in fact prejudiced by the delay, or even that the drawer seeking
discharge should have to prove that he was prejudiced. Indeed, in
one of the earliest cases, Chief Justice Holt had said as much. llo
During the course of the eighteenth century, however, the tie be-
tween rationale and rule became more attenuated, and the rule
became fixed that delay in notice automatically discharged the
drawer, regardless of actual prejudice. III In sum, what started as a
response to a specific argument about why someone should not be
called on to make good a dishonored bill evolved into a rigid rule
that took no account of the specifics of the case. That, of course, is
hardly a surprising development when there is not a satisfactory
way of deciding what to do about the specific cases.
Although the rules on whether presentment and notice were
required became quite rigid, some element of flexibility did remain
in the specification of when such action was required. In the cases
of bankers' notes and other demand paper, presentment was re-
quired within "a reasonable time." Similarly, upon dishonor of any
bill, notice had to be given within "a reasonable time." Until the
latter part of the eighteenth century, the question whether the
holder had acted within a reasonable time was entirely left to the
jury, 112 who, we may surmise, took account as best they could of the
equities of the specific cases beyond the particular questions of
timeliness of the holder's conduct.
In the 1780s, however, the judges of King's Bench became very
dissatisfied with the unpredictable results of leaving the issue to
juries and sought to take over the issue as a question of law. In
Medcalf v. Hall,113 a debtor paid his creditor with a draft on his
bankers. The draft was given at one o'clock in the afternoon, and
the bankers failed at five. The debtor was sued on the original debt,
and defended on the grounds that the creditor had delayed unduly
by not presenting the draft within the remaining four hours during
110 Mogadara, 88 Eng. Rep. 1134. See also Hart v. King, 12 Mod. 310 (K.B. 1700).
III See J. CHITIY, JR., A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 57 (1834).
Moreover, although the original rationale of the discharge is rather difficult to apply to
indorsers, who would generally have no dealings with the drawee, indorsers were given the
benefit of the discharge as well as drawers. In Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. 669, 97 Eng.
Rep. 503 (K.B. 1758), Lord Mansfield explained the indorsers' discharge on the basis of the
purely formal theory that an indorsement is, in effect, the drawing of a new bill.
112 Hankey v. Trotman, 1 Black. W. 1,96 Eng. Rep. 1 (K.B. 1747); Hoar v. Dacosta, 2
Str. 910, 93 Eng. Rep. 935 (K.B. 1731); Manwaring v. Harrison, 1 Stt. 508,93 Eng. Rep.
666 (K.B. 1721); Hill v. Lewis, 1 Salk. 131,91 Eng. Rep. 124 (K.B. 1693). .
liS 3 Doug!. 113, 99 Eng. Rep. 566 (K.B. 1782).
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that day before the bankers failed. At the trial, Lord Mansfield left
the issue to the jury, but his instructions and summary of the evi-
dence left them in no doubt about how he thought it should be
decided. He suggested that it would be very desirable to have "some
certain rule to meet all cases of a like kind," and commented favor-
ably on the rule among many London bankers and merchants that
presentment within twenty-four hours sufficed. He also admon-
ished the jury that if they "thought that a man taking a bill was to
run to receive it, they must be aware of the inconvenience of taking
drafts." The jury, though, in its inscrutable wisdom, did not take
the hint and returned a verdict for the defendant. Mansfield di-
o rected a new trial, and the case came before the full bench on
defendant's objection to the grant of a second trial. In his opinion
Mansfield noted that, "[n]othing is more mischievous than uncer-
tainty in commercial law. It would be terrible if every question were
to make a cause, and to be decided according to the temper of a
jury. If a rule is intended to apply to and govern a number of like
cases, that rule is a rule of l<l.w." Justice Buller concurred and went
further to suggest that it be established as a rule of law that pres-
entment on the day after receipt sufficed. Mansfield and Ashurst
were willing to adopt Buller's suggestion. Justice Willes agreed that
there should be a new trial, but was reluctant to lay down a general
rule. Thus, at the second trial, the matter was again left to the jury,
and the jury stuck to their position returning a second verdict for
the defendant, and "delivering their reason in writing, that, accord-
ing to the usage of the city, there was sufficient time for the plaintiff
either to have received it himself or to have sent it to his bankers."
A rule for a new trial was again obtained, and brought up for
consideration by the full bench, but before decision the plaintiff
gave up and presented his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings
against the bankers. 114
114 There was another case, Appleton v. Sweetapple, 3 Dougl. 137, 99 Eng. Rep. 579
(K.B. 1782), involving a draft on the same bankers, Brown & Collinson, in which the creditor
had received the draft at noon and deposited it for collection with his own bankers that
afternoon. The collecting bank presented it to Brown & Collinson that evening, but following
the practice among bankers it was not then paid, but was "marked," see Robson v. Bennett,
2 Taunt. 388, 127 Eng. Rep. 1128 (C.P. 1810), to be paid at the clearings the next day. The
draft was not paid before Brown & Collinson failed, and the creditor sued on the original
debt. As in Metkalj, the jury gave a verdict for the defendant, and the case came before
King's Bench on a motion for new trial. Lord Mansfield backed off somewhat from the
position taken in Metkalj, saying that although the general rule should be that presentment
by the day after receipt sufficed, the time could be shortened by proof of a usage. He
believed, however, that the usage had not been proved at trial. Judge B"uller held to the
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Four years later the question again came before King's Bench
in Tindal v. Brown. 115 Tindal was the holder of a note made by
Donaldson and indorsed by Brown. On the day the note came due,
Tindal sent his clerk to Donaldson to demand payment. Donaldson
was not home, so the clerk left word, and returned the following
morning. That day the clerk did find Donaldson home, and Don-
aldson said that he would pay the note when his bank was open.
Donaldson, however, failed to do so, and when the clerk returned
the following morning, Donaldson admitted that he could not pay
it. The clerk then went to the indorser, Tindal, who refused to pay
on the grounds that the holder's failure to notify him of dishonor
on the first day that the note came due discharged him. The jury
evidently believed that the holder had given notice within a reason-
able time and gave a verdict against the indorser. On the motion
for new trial, Mansfield stated that
What is reasonable notice is partly a question of fact,
and partly a question of law. It may depend in some
measure on facts; such as the distance at which the parties
live from each other, the course of the post, &c. But
wherever a rule can be laid down as to reasonableness,
that should be decided by the Court, and adhered to by
everyone for the sake of certainty.116
Judges Ashurst and Buller agreed that reasonableness of time
should be regarded as a question of. law. As Buller put it,
The numerous cases on this subject reflect great discredit
on the Courts of Westminster. They do infinite mischief
in the mercantile world; and this evil can only be remedied
by doing what the Court wished to do in the case of
Medcalf and Hall; by considering the reasonableness of
time as a question oflaw and not of fact. 117
Although the judges left little doubt about their frustration with
the inconsistent results of juries in these matters,118 the case had
position that the question was purely one of law, and if any usage were alleged it should be
for the court to judge whether the usage was reasonable. A new trial was granted, but, as in
Medcalf, the jury returned another verdict for defendant at the second trial.
115 1 T.R. 167,99 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1786).
116 [d. at 1034.
117 [d. at 1035.
118 As Mansfield said,
It was well observed by counsel that the juries were obstinate in the case of
Melkalf and Hall, where they struggled so hard, in spite of the opinion of the
, Court, to narrow the rule, that they held you must in certain cases demand
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come up on motion for new trial, so the Court's power was limited
to granting a new triaL As in Medcalf, the jury stuck to its position
and gave a second verdict for the holder. Counsel for the holder
suggested that the judges should simply give up, rather than grant
a third trial in a case involving only a small amount of money, but
the judges held their ground and granted a third trial, at which the
case was put to the jury only for a special verdict as to the facts and
the court entered judgment for the indorser as a matter of law. I 19
Taking the issue from the jury was one thing; deciding what
to do with it was another. Problems of specifying the precise obli-
gations of a holder upon dishonor did not go away after Tindal; if
anything, the problems came to occupy a larger and larger portion
of the courts' time, for the judges had taken it upon themselves to
resolve these matters by general rules rather than leaving them to
the jury. From the end of the eighteenth century through the early
nineteenth century, innumerable cases posed fine points about the
diligence required of the holder of a dishonored bill. 120
The importance and difficulty of the task ofspecifying the rules
on this subject is illustrated by the one instance in which the judges
relented from their determination to establish fixed rules requiring
timely notice of dishonor. In a 17.86 decision, Bickerdike v. Bollman, 121
payment on a banker's draft within an hour. Here the struggle is to give a
greater latitude than is necessary.
[d. at 1034.
119 Although later decisions generally followed Tindafs ruling that reasonableness of
time was partly a question of law and partIy of fact, the procedure employed in the last trial
in Tindal of having the jury return a special verdict as to the facts with the judge ruling on
the reasonableness of the time, seems not to have been generally adopted. Rather, we find
later cases coming before the full bench on motions for new trial after the question had been
left to thejury. E.g., Darbishire v. Barker, 6 East 3,102 Eng. Rep. 1184 (K.B. 1805). Moreover,
in cases involving bills payable within a certain period after sight, there are decisions after
Tindal explicitly holding that although the holder must either present the bill or put it into
circulation within a reasonable time, the question of reasonableness must be left to the jury.
Fry v. Hill, 7 Taunt. 397, 129 Eng. Rep. 158 (C.P. 1817); Goupy v. Harden, 7 Taunt. 159,
129 Eng. Rep. 64 (C.P. 1816). The treatise writers long after Tindal continued to note that
it was unsettled whether the issue ,vas for judge or jury. See, e.g., J. BAYLEY, BILLS OF
EXCHANGE ch. 7, § 1 (5th ed. 1830); J. CHIITY, BILLS OF EXCHANGE 237-38 (4th ed. 1811).
120 E.g., Geill v. Jeremy, 1 Moo. & M. 61, 173 Eng. Rep. 1081 (Tenterden at nisi prius
1827) (if no post goes out the next day, must holder give notice by the late post of day of
receipt?); Williams v. Smith, 2 Barn. & Ald. 496, 106 Eng. Rep. 447 (K.B. 1819) (if party to
be notified is in different city, must notice be sent by the next practical post, or is it sufficient
to send by post the following day?); Smith v. Mullett, 2 Campb. 208, 170 Eng. Rep. 1131
(Ellenborough at nisi prius 1809) (is it sufficient if holder puts notice in post at end of day
following receipt but too late for last post?); Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & PuI. 599, 127 Eng.
Rep. 323 (C.P. 1804) (if bill has been left with banker for collection, does this extend time
for giving notice?).
121 1 T.R. 405, 99 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1786).
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the judges of King's Bench showed that they too could be moved
to bend the rules in light of the equities of particular cases. In that
case, a hard pressed debtor tried to hold off one creditor by giving
him a bill drawn on another firm. As it turned out, this was nothing
but a crude stalling effort, for the firm on which the bill was drawn
held no funds due to the drawer. Quite the contrary, the drawer
actually owed a substantial sum to the drawee. The bill was, of
course, dishonored, and the disgusted holder did not bother with
the formalities usually required in ordinary bill dealings. When the
creditor sued, however, the debtor brazenly put in the defense that
the debt was discharged because the creditor had not given him
notice of dishonor of the bogus bill. That was too much even for
judges who had so strongly urged the adoption of clear, certain
rules in bill dealings, and the court ruled that notice of dishonor
was unnecessary in such a case. 122
It is unlikely that the judges who decided Bickerdike had any
idea what a monster they had created. Parties fighting over liability
on a dishonored bill now had a vehicle for arguing that the loss
should fall on another, even though they may have slipped in the
attempt to follow the rigid rules. There turned out to be many cases
where bills were drawn on someone who held no effects of the
drawer in perfectly legitimate circumstances where the drawer
might well be prejudiced by lack of timely notice. For example, in
the ordinary dealings between merchants, it commonly happened
that a merchant shipped goods on commission to his agent and
immediately drew a bill for the expected sales proceeds of the goods
under an arrangement with the commission agent permitting him
to draw in advance of the actual sale. In such cases, the drawer may
have had no effects in the drawee's hands at the time the bill was
drawn, for the goods might not even have arrived, yet the drawer
had legitimate reason to assume that the drawee would honor the
bill. 123 In other cases, the accounts between drawer and drawee
fluctuated between the time the bill was drawn and the time it was
122 As Judge Buller explained,
The law requires notice to be given ... because it is presumed that the bill is
drawn on account of the drawee's having effects of the drawer in the hands;
and if the latter has notice that the bill is not accepted, or not paid, he may
withdraw them immediately. But if he has no effects in the other's hands, then
he cannot be injured for want of notice.
Id. at 1167.
12' See Rucker v. Hiller, 16 East 43, 104 Eng. Rep. 1005 (K.B. 1812); Rogers v. Stephens,
2 T.R. 713, 100 Eng. Rep. 384·(K.B. 1788).
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presented and dishonored. Even though the drawer may, at some
point, have had no effects in the drawee's hands, he could well be
prejudiced by want of notice. 124 Moreover, if Bickerdille excused
notice on the grounds that the drawer could not have been preju-
diced where he had no effects in the drawee's hands, then should
holders who failed to give notice in other circumstances be allowed
to recover from prior parties by showing that they suffered no
actual prejudice from the want of notice?125
The judges struggled to confine the Bickerdike exception nar-
rowly,126 but the law on excuse of notice became exceedingly com-
plex. As Theophilus Parsons put it in the introductory remarks to
the chapter of his bills treatise dealing with the subject:
It may be doubted whether any branch of commercial
law, somewhat narrow in itself, exhibits so large a number
of cases, and so boundless a variety in their facts and the
conclusions from them, as those which relate to the subject
of this chapter. It is not easy to imagine any circumstance
attending non-notice which in some form or other is not
urged as an excuse for it. And the decisions of the courts
permit authorities to be cited on both sides of almost any
question. 127
Indeed, virtually every major judge of the English common law
courts in the early nineteenth century expressed at some point great
regret that the Bickerdike exception had ever been allowed.128
Lawyers of the twentieth century have been so blinded by the
conviction that negotiability has always been the heart and soul of
.124 See Thackray v. Blackett, 3 Campb. 164, 170 Eng. Rep. 1342 (Ellenborough at nisi
prius 1812); B1ackhan v. Doren, 2 Campb. 503, 170 Eng. Rep. 1232 (Ellenborough at nisi
prius 1810); Orr v. Maginnis, 7 East 358, 103 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1806).
125 See Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. 158, 170 Eng. Rep. 572 (Kenyon at nisi prius 1800);
Staples v. Okines, 1 Esp. 333, 170 Eng. Rep. 375 (Kenyon at nisi prius 1795).
126 See B1ackhan v. Doren, 2 Campb. 503, 170 Eng. Rep. 1232 (Ellenborough at nisi
prius 1810); Legge v. Thorpe, 12 East 175,104 Eng. Rep. 68 (K.B. 1810); Orr v. Maginnis,
7 East 358, 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1806); Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. 158, 170 Eng. Rep.
572 (Kenyon at nisi prius 1800); Staples v. Okines, 1 Esp. 333, 170 Eng. Rep. 375 (Kenyon
at nisi prius 1795).
127 1 T. PARSONS, PROMISSORY NOTES AND BILLS OF EXCHANGE at 521 (1863). The chapter
on excuse of notice runs over 110 pages.
128 See, e.g., Cory v. Scott, 3 B. & Ald. 619, 106 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1820) (Abbott, C.].);
Ex parte Heath, 2 Yes. & Bea. 240, 35 Eng. Rep. 310 (Ch. 1813) (Lord Eldon); Orr v.
Maginnis, 7 East 359, 103 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B. 1806) (Ellenborough, C.J.); Clegg v. Cotton,
3 Box. & Pul. 239, 127 Eng. Rep. 132 (C.P. 1802) (Alvanley, C.J.); Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp.
158, 170 Eng. Rep. 572 (Kenyon at nisi prius 1800); Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Box. & Pul.
652, 126 Eng. Rep. 1115 (C.P. 1797) (Eyre, C.J.).
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the law of bills and notes that they have difficulty understanding
how anyone ever could have cared about what seem to be bizarrely
picayune and inconsequential questions of presentment, notice of
dishonor, excuse of notice, and the like. For example, in White &
Summers-the dominant current treatise on the VeC-none of these
topics even gets separate treatment in their own chapters or sections.
Instead, there are only a few pages on these topics, introduced with
the following remark:
Article Three, Part 5 defines "dishonor," "presentment,"
and related terms, specifies when presentment is neces-
sary, and tells when one might give notice of dishonor-
all in boring and incessant detail. At the risk of oversim-
plifying, but in the interest of lightening the reader's load,
we will outline the pertinent provisions.129
The author of a typical early twentieth century hornbook130 is even
more explicit about it. He dutifully devotes three chapters to pres-
entment, notice, and protest, prefacing them with a suggestion that
the reader need not bother reading them,131 and then breathes a
great sigh of relief when he finally reaches the important material,
the holder in due course rules:
The three chapters immediately preceding have dealt with
matters of minute detail, these being the statutory regu-
lations concerning the procedure at maturity. We have
now emerged onto the high road again, which in this
chapter [entitled "The Holder and His Rights"] traverses
the very heart and center of our territory.132
The twentieth century lawyers could not be more wrong. In
the cla'ssical era of the law of bills and notes, the rules about holders
in due course were a fairly minor point. The fine points of the rules
concerning procedure on dishonor were the heart of the law of bills
and notes in the classical era. The judges of the classical era fre-
quently noted the importance of these matters. For example, in a
case about the time for presentment of notes, Lord Kenyon re-
129 WHITE & SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 13-10 at 506 (2d ed. 1980).
ISO R. REDFIELD, THE LAw OF COMMERCIAL PAPER (1929).
lSI rd. at 263. ("Some readers may prefer to treat this chapter and the two immediately
following as a reference matter. These chapters are occupied with consideration of detailed
rules laid down by the Act for guidance through the formalities observable at maturity
..•.[T]he reader ... may tread lightly over the ground in front of us.")
IS2 rd. at 316.
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marked that "This question is of ... infinite importance in every
hour's transactions in the commercial world."133 Similarly, Chief
Justice Abbot noted that "It is of the greatest importance to com-
merce that some plain and precise rule should be laid down, to
guide persons in all cases as to the time within which notices of the
dishonour of bills must be given."'34 And in 1841, Lord Denmam
remarked that "Perhaps Lord Mansfield never conferred so great
a benefit on the commercial world, as by his decision in Tindal v.
Brown, where his perseverance compelled them, in spite of them-
selves, to submit to the doctrine of requiring immediate notice as a
matter of law."135
The treatises on bills and notes also evidence the preeminent
importance of these issues. In a typical treatise of the late eighteenth
or early nineteenth century, these issues make up the bulk of the
book. For example, in the sixth edition of Chitty, published in 1822,
the chapters dealing with the steps that the holder must follow in
dealing with the drawee and preserving rights against prior parties
account for a bit over one-third of the book. Moreover, in common
with many of the treatises of that era, a great deal of the book
(about one-third) was devoted to questions of procedure in litigation
on bills and notes. Thus, of the part of the book dealing with the
substance of the law of bills and notes, about one-half was devoted
to these issues concerning unravelling the chains of payment trans-
actions in the event of dishonor of the bill. Indeed, these questions
about the procedures to be followed upon failure of the principal
obligor to pay were matters of such concern in the everyday conduct
of business that by the early nineteenth century, a ready market for
vest pocket-sized guides to the law of bills and notes developed. '36
A late twentieth century law professor confronting a sea of yawning
faces in a classroom discussion of the intricacies of Article 3 and 4
can only sigh wistfully upon reading in the preface to one such
pocket book:
The following little Manual is designed for the use of
Traders and others having dealings in Bills of Exchange,
133 Brown v. Harraden, 4 T.R. 148, 100 Eng. Rep. 943, 945 (K.B. 1791).
13< Williams v. Smith, 2 Barn. & Ald. 496, 106 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (K.B. 1819).
135 Furze v. Shanvood, 2 Q.B. 388, 415, 114 Eng. Rep. 154, 164 (Q.B. 1841).
136 J.I. MAXWELL, A POCKET DICTIONARY OF THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY
NOTES, CHECKS, &c. (1802); R. MUIR, A PRACTICAL SUMMARY OF THE LAw RELATING TO BILLS
OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES, INTENDED CHIEFLY FOR THE USE OF MERCHANTS (1836);
J. ROLLE, THE POCKET COMPANION OF THE LAw OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, PROMISSORY NOTES,
DRAFTS, CHECKS, &c. (2d ed. 1815).
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Promissory Notes, Checks, Drafts, &c. The extensive op-
eration which these instruments have obtained in com-
mercial transactions renders it unnecessary to expiate on
the utility and importance of a publication like the present.
In the whole of British. law there is not perhaps, any
branch (exempting those whi~h regulate our civil rights
and liberties) of more extensive import than that which
regulates the effect and operation of Bills of Exchange
and Promissory Notes. To be acquainted, therefore, with
the nature and properties of these instruments; to know
the laws and customs which regulate their presentment
for acceptance, their presentment for payment, their pay-
ment, the notice of their dishonor, their protest, and the
proceedings for the recovery of their value, is certainly
not an useless or unprofitable acquisition; nor is the at-
tempt to supply th~s necessary information at a trifling
cost and in a portable form, a less useful or profitable
undertaking. 137
Andrew Jackson would have understood.
VII. SPECULATIONS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE MYTH
The evidence is overwhelming that the law of bills and notes
in the classical era was nothing like the body of law that is discussed
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century books. In partic-
ular, the common assumption of twentieth century lawyers and legal
historians that the law of bills and notes developed in response to
a universal mercantile need for debt instruments that could circulate
as payment media free from defenses and claims is nothing but a
myth. Although that assertion seems surprising at the outset, we
have seen that once we delve into the specifics of actual mercantile
practice in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it becomes
easy to understand why issues about freedom from claims and
defenses were not matters of major concern. We are, though, left
with a different puzzle. What accounts for the transformation that
brought the concept of negotiability to dominate. the profession's
sense of this body of law in the twentieth century?
Given the prominence of the concept of negotiability in the
case law and treatises of the late nineteenth century, it would be
foolish to deny that negotiability doctrines must have developed in
response to some significant commercial need. It is, however, not
IS7 J. ROLLE, supra note 136, at v-vi.
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nearly as obvious what that commercial need was. If we surmise
that the appearance of negotiability concepts in the treatises lagged
a few decades behind the changes in litigation and commercial
practice, then we may hypothesize that the mid-nineteenth century
was the period of the development of the commercial practices that
brought negotiability to the fore. One possibility is that with the
development of modern rules of procedure concerning set-off and
counterclaim, the defenses that previously could not have been
asserted even in an action between the immediate parties now be-
came available. Thus, the holder in due course rules might have
become significant to protect remote parties against such set-offs or
counterclaims. Indeed, a staunch supporter of the traditional ac-
count of the history of the law of bills and notes might contend that
the evidence adduced in this article requires only a revision of the
chronology-negotiability developed in response to the mercantile
need for debt instruments that could circulate as payment media
free from defenses and claims, although that need did not become
critical until the mid- to late-nineteenth century.
That hypothesis, however, is difficult to square with the history
of payment systems in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. Ironically, the concept of negotiability came to dominate the
law of bills and notes at about the same time that private mercantile
instruments ceased to play an important role in the payment system.
Scholars. of economic and business history have noted that in both
the United States and England, circulating private instruments
largely passed from the scene by the latter part of the nineteenth
century. The usual explanation for the American development is
that around the time of the Civil War, the use of open book credit,
with relatively short credit periods and a discount for cash payment,
largely displaced the earlier practice of selling on .long credit terms
represented by notes or acceptances,138 and that since that time
American businessmen have not commonly used any written debt
instruments in ordinary inter-business dealings.139 In England, the
usual explanation is that inland commercial bills largely ceased to
perform any necessary function with the amalgamation of banking
firms into a few large nationwide concerns.140 These differing ex-
188 See, e.g., B. KLEBANER, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES: A HISTORY 80
(1974); G. PORTER & H. LIVESAY, MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS 125-27 (1971).
189 Credit sales among businesses are, of course, routine, but they are almost invariably
conducted on an open account basis. See, e.g., R. SOLDOFSKY & G. OLIVE, FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT 454 (1974).
140 See A. FEAVERYEAR, THE POUND STERLING 318-21 (2d ed. 1963); S. NISHIMURA, THE
DECLINE OF INLAND BILLS OF EXCHANGE IN THE LONDON MONEY MARKET (1971).
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planations are probably flip sides of the same coin. In the classical
era of bills and notes, the payment system was not separate from
non-financial commercial dealings. Rather, every merchant was, in
effect, one of the participants in the payment system. By the early
twentieth century, however, the payment system had become a spe-
cialized function of financial institutions and governmental or quasi-
governmental entities. Circulating paper currency was issued only
by national banks of one sort or another, and the great bulk of
payments were not made by circulating paper at all but by inter-
bank transfers effected through the check system, clearing houses,
and standard procedures for inter-regional check clearings. 141
Thus, although liberalization of set-off and counterclaim rules
in the late nineteenth century may have expanded the- range of
possible defenses to bills and notes, that should have been a matter
of relatively minor concern to the payment system given that bills
and notes were being replaced by other payment media. Accord-
ingly, if the rise to prominence of the concept of negotiability is to
be explained as a reflection of nineteenth century developments in
commercial practice, we must look to transactions other than the
circulation of mercantile instruments as a payment mechanism. One
possibility, suggested by Gilmore, is that the holder in due course
rules were important in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries because they happened to meet the desir~s of banks and
other lenders in the emerging business of consumer lending.142
14\ One would expect that the law of bills and notes should have passed into oblivion
with the passing of the subject matter. In a sense, that did happen. The real descendants of
the topics about bills and notes that were matters of everyday concern to merchants of the
eighteenth century are not found in Article 3 of the D.C.C., but in the rules about interbank
procedures in check collections, bank credit card arrangements, and electronic funds trans-
fers that are found, or buried, in various statutes, regulations and private agreements. Today,
these are matters of concern only to the few bankers and bank lawyers who handle the
occasional problems that arise. Merchants of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century
really did have good reason to carry around vest pocket guides to the law governing proce-
dures on dishonored bills. By contrast, only the most peculiar of commercial law professors
would today carry around a copy of the Federal Reserve System regulations on check
collections.
142 Gilmore assumed that negotiability was an important aspect of the law of bills and
notes in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, so that his position was not that
consumer lending gave rise to the concept of negotiability, but that these transactions were
what kept it alive. As he put it:
My suggestion was that the whole thing was a sensitive and intuitive judicial
response to the phenomenon of mercantile bills of exchange used as currency
and circulating in a world-wide market. Now suppose that, after 1850, these
bills were no longer used as currency, no longer circulated in a market and
indeed disappeared. If nothing more was involved, we would expect the pre-
1850 law of negotiable instruments to dry up and disappear-just as the no
doubt beautifully organized law of sea-shells dried up and disappeared after
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Although the advantage of the holder in due course doctrine to
lenders in consumer finance might account for the survival of ne-
gotiability into the mid-twentieth century, it seems unlikely that the
origins of the negotiability concept are to be found in consumer
lending transactions. If we assume that the changes in commercial
practice that gave rise to the prominence of the negotiability concept
occurred sometime in the mid- to late-nineteenth century, then the
phenomenon antedates significant consumer finance by decades.
A more plausible hypothesis is that the origins of the concept
of negotiability are to be found in mid- to late-nineteenth century
business practice; but that the relevant practice was not the circu-
lation of instruments as a payment mechanism, but from the role of
instruments in the credit system. Although exploration of this issue
would take me well beyond the intended scope of this article, my
preliminary research on nineteenth century practice suggests that
the professionalization of the credit system lagged significantly be-
hind the professionalization of the payment system. Even after
checks had largely replaced circulating bills and notes as the ordi-
nary means of payment in business transactions in major commer-
cial centers, it appears that it was still quite common for businesses
and others to raise money by issuing notes that might be sold to
investors or banks through various sorts of brokers and other in-
termediaries. Indeed, the market for such notes seems to have
served as a kind of auxiliary credit system for those who were unable
to secure credit directly from banks. 143
One aspect of this credit system that might be particularly likely
to have given rise to assertions of defenses was that many of the
notes and bills were what eighteenth and nineteenth century writers
described as mere accommodation bills-that is, they did not arise
out of either an actual sale of goods or the shipment of goods to a
commission agent, but were simply borrowings for miscellaneous
purposes where the borrower's promise to repay the loan was
wampum ceased to be currency. Suppose further, however, that the pre-1850
negotiable instruments rules turned out to be exactly what a powerful group of
entrepreneurs wanted in conjunction with novel types of transactions in which
they were planning to engage ...
The banks . . . presently began to experiment with the novel .idea of lending
money to poor people....
Gilmore, Fonnalism and the Law ofNegotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 451-52
(1979).
143 See Dailey, The Early Development of the Note-Brokerage Business in Chicago, 46 J. OF
POLIT. ECON. 202 (1938).
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backed up by the guaranty of various indorsers. Indorsers who were
sued on instruments of that sort would be particularly likely to raise
defenses, either their own suretyship defenses or defenses of the
borrower asserted derivatively by the indorser. It is not difficult to
see how the holder in due course rules on preclusion of defenses
might come to playa far more significant role in credit transactions
of that sort than in the eighteenth century payment system.
Another possibility is that the commercial practice that gave
rise to the concept of negotiability was the expansion of the market
for investment securities, particularly bonds. In support of the latter
hypothesis, one might note that many of the late nineteenth century
cases that are commonly cited as the clearest expressions of the
meaning of negotiability involved not bills or notes as payment
devices, but investment securities such as corporate debentures and
government bonds,144 and that many of the late nineteenth century
treatises do devote a great deal of attention to investment securi-
ties. 145
Yet, even if we can identify some specific legal, commercial, or
financial development in the late nineteenth century as the circum-
stance that prompted greater concern with the rules on claims and
defenses, the explanation does not really seem adequate to explain
why the concept of negotiability came to play such a dominant role.
The changes in- the Jaw of bills and notes that might have been
made necessary by liberalization of procedural rules or the devel-
opment of new forms of instruments could easily have been accom-
modated within the same basic pattern of organization and empha-
sis that had characterized the books on bills and notes for over a
century. Perhaps a new chapter or two on defenses or some new
chapters on investment securities or consumer notes would be
144 E.g., Goodwin v. Robarts, 1 App. Cas. 476 (1876); Crouch v. The Credit Foncier,
Ltd., 8 L.R.-Q.B. 374 (1873).
•45 Daniel, for example, devotes several chapters of his treatise to corporate and munic-
ipal bonds, and in his preface remarks that one of the reasons he undertook work on the
treatise was that the existing books predated the development of bonds.
[W]hen Chancellor Kent wrote his Commentaries, such a thing as a coupon
bond was unknown in the United States. When Story sent forth his treatises on
Bills and Notes from Cambridge, it was yet a feeble adventurer, timidly finding
its way on the stock exchange. And although when Professor Parsons published
his work in 1862, it had been recognized as a negotiable instrument, and was
becoming familiar to the public eye, the law concerning it was yet in such an
inchoate state that a few pages comprehended all that he saw fit to say about
it. Now there is no more important figure in financial circles than a coupon
bond.
J.W. DANIEL, 1 TREATISE OF THE LAw OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS vi (1876).
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needed, but the basic structure of the books could remain un-
changed. That, however, is not what happened. Rather than openly
discussing newly developing problems concerning ne,~ forms of
instruments, the treatise authors of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries insisted that circulation of mercantile instru-
ments as a payment mechanism was the practice that gave rise to
the concept of negotiability. Similarly, rather than explaining that
changes in commercial practice required changes in the law, the
treatise authors emphatically asserted that the law of bills and notes
had developed long ago and remained fundamentally unchanged
through the centuries.
The late nineteenth century change in the law of bills and notes
does not seem to have been merely an adaptation to changing
commercial practice. Rather, there seems to have been a profound
transformation in the profession's sense of this entire body of law.
The nature of the transformation in this body of law may perhaps
best be understood by considering how the subject is defined. There
are, no doubt, many ways of describing and classifying the various
ways that particular legal subjects are defined and delimited. For
present purposes, I wish to note one such distinction. Consider the
contrast between such subjects as the Law of Admiralty, Banking,
or Sales, on the one hand, and the Law of Estoppel, Conversion,
or Forfeiture, on the other. Legal subjects such as Admiralty or
Banking Law represent classificatory approaches that start from
non-legal categories. We regard it as sensible to talk about the Law
of Banking, for example, because people do engage in banking and
it is sometimes useful to consider together all of the various legal
problems presented in the course of this distinct segment of human
activity. Legal subjects such as Estoppel or Conversion, by contrast,
represent classificatory approaches purely internal to the legal sys-
tem. We regard it as sensible to talk about the Law of Estoppel, for
example, not because we believe that people go around "estopping"
or that that term describes a discrete body of human behavior, but
because the concept of estoppel is used in the resolution of legal
problems presented in a variety of settings, and it is sometimes
useful to consider together all of the various ways in which that
concept is used in the legal system. For want of better locutions, I
shall use the term "exogenous" to refer to classifications of the sort
that delimit the scope of a body of law by reference to a discrete
body of non-legal behavior, and "endogenous" to refer to classifi-
cations of the sort that delimit the scope of a body of law by ref-
erence to purely legal concepts.
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The essence of the transformation in the law of bills and notes
that occurred sometime between the classical era and the twentieth
century is that the defining principle of this body of law shifted
from exogenous to endogenous. The shift is apparent even at the
level of nomenclature. Consider the titles of the treatises. The full
title of Byles on Bills was A Practical Compendium of the Law ofBills of
Exchange, Promissory Notes, Bank-Notes, Bankers' Cash-Notes and Checks.
The titles of all of the other treatises of that era take essentially the
same form: "The Law of ... ," with the ellipsis filled in with a list
of then current forms of instruments. By the end of the nineteenth
century, however, the titles take quite a different form, the most
common being The Law of Negotiable Instruments. The descriptive
laundry list of forms of instruments used in mercantile practice has
been replaced by a collective noun defined by the legal characteristic
of negotiability. Indeed, the use of the noun form, "negotiability"
seems to have become common only in the later part of the nine-
teenth century; earlier authors did use the phrase "negotiable in-
strument" as a shorthand for the laundry list, but seem to have felt
no need for a noun to denote the special legal attribute of "nego-
tiability."146
The classical law of bills and notes was an exogenously defined
body of law: it was the body of law that dealt with all of the various
sorts of problems that arose from the actual transactions and prac-
tices of the seventeenth and eighteenth century merchants using
bills and notes. Major portions of the treatises were devoted to such
topics as the Stamp Act duties on bills and notes, extensive discus-
sion of all of the agency law questions that might arise in connection
with the use of bills and notes, lengthy discussions of pleading,
evidence, and proof in actions on bills, discussions of proof and
treatment of claims on bills in bankruptcy proceedings, criminal law
issues concerning forgery of bills and notes, etc., etc.147 This was an
146 Although I did not keep notes on this specific point in examining the bills and notes
treatises, the first use of the word "negotiability" that I recall was in Story's 1845 treatise on
Promissory Notes, and the first use of the term in the modern sense was in Daniel's treatise
in 1876. Even as late as 1898, use of the noun form seems to have been sufficiently uncon-
ventional that a casebook editor surrounded it with quotation marks. E. HUFFCUT, THE LAw
OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, STATUTES, CASES AND AUTHORITIES 341 n.1 (1896) ("For a
luminous discussion of 'negotiability' see Willis on Negotiable Securities (1896), Lectures I
and II.")
147 The title page of the eighth edition of Chitty, published in 1833, describes the work
as:
A practical treatise on bills of exchange, checks on bankers, promissory notes,
bankers cash notes, and bank notes. The 8th ed., newly modelled, and greatly
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important body of law because the use of bills and notes was im-
portant to commerce as then conducted. The specific issues that
were important were those that arose from the actual transactions,
not from some jurisprudential theory.
By contrast, the negotiable instruments law of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century is an endogenously defined body
of law: it is the law of negotiability, rather than the law of particular
commercial instruments. The law turned inwards, so to speak, look-
ing to its own legal concepts and categories as the points of major
significance, rather than defining itself and concerning itself with
problems and concerns drawn from an actual body of commercial
practice. The treatises of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries invariably began with a lengthy, theoretical explanation
and justification of the existence of a discrete body of negotiable
instruments law-based entirely on the concept of negotiability. A
major part of that discussion was frequently a discussion, at times
surprisingly heated, of the exact correct meaning of the term "ne-
gotiable" that defined the subject matter. 148 Perhaps the most ex-
treme instance of this phenomenon is found in the work of the
English lawyer William Willis, who, in a series of lectures in 1896,
insisted that an instrument could properly be described as negoti-
able only if it was in such form that a bona fide purchaser from a
thief would take free of adverse claims, and thus instruments that
required indorsement for transfer could not be negotiable because
the title of subsequent purchasers depended on the validity of the
indorsement. 149 Thus, for Willis the i~sistence on doctrinal purity
would lead to exclusion from the subject of a great bulk of the
instruments actually used in commerce. By contrast, the treatise
writers of the classical era felt no particular need to explain or
justify the existence of this body of law: the need for the law of bills
and notes, and books discussing it, was self-evident. Bills were a
regular part of everyday commercial life and this was the law re-
solving the problems that arose in everyday life.
enlarged and improved; with references to the law of Scotland, France, and
America; and new chapters on agents, partners, consideration, stamps, requi-
sites, loss, times of presentment, non-payment, protest and notice, evidence,
bankruptcy, forgery, larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses; and an ap-
pendix of precedents.
148 See, e.g., Randall, Book Review, 29 LAW. Q. REV. 486 (1913) (reviewing B. JACOBS, A
SHORT TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, CHEQUES, PROMISSORY NOTES, AND
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS generally (1913».
149 W. WILLIS, THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES 6-8 (1896). Willis's lectures were
evidently quite influential. At least five editions appeared in published form through 1930.
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The topics covered in the treatises of the modern era also reflect
this fundamental difference in approach. As I have already noted,
the central organizing principle of the modern books is negotiability,
in the sense of the holder in due course rules. Many of the topics
that accounted for major parts of the treatises of the classical era,
such as bankruptcy, procedure, evidence, and the like, are com-
pletely gone by the time of the treatises of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, simply because they do not fit into the
conception of this as a body of law centered around the concept of
negotiability. Moreover, the material that still is included has been
'reorganized. Where a classical era treatise would have had separate
lengthy chapters dealing with all questions of legal capacity and
agency that might affect parties' obligations on bills, a twentieth
century treatise will cover only parts of the topics in the course of
discussion of the distinction between "real" and "personal" defenses.
Perhaps the most striking change, though, is the treatment of the
cases and rules about the rights of holders of lost or stolen instru-
ments. In the classical era treatises, these topics were generally
treated in a separate chapter, usually quite short and usually found
in the back of the book with other miscellany of relatively little
importance. By contrast, in the twentieth century books, Miller v.
Race150 is the case that defines the law of negotiable instruments, for
it is the quintessential instance of the distinction between negotia-
bility and mere assignability.
Changes in commercial practice in the late nineteenth century
may well account for an increase in the number of cases posing
problems about defenses and claims of the sort dealt with by the
holder in due course rules. On the other hand, such changes in
practice do not seem adequate to explain the radical transformation
in the profession's sense of the body of law or the distorted portrayal
of its history that is so prominent in the law books from the late
nineteenth century. Thus, the problem of explaining the transfor-
mation of the classical era law of bills and notes into the twentieth
century law of negotiable instruments may be more a matter of
intellectual history than commercial history.
From the perspective of legal intellectual history, there is an
intriguing coincidence between the transformation of the law of
bills and notes and developments in the study of legal history. The
concept of negotiability seems to have come to prominence in the
150 1 Burr. 452, 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (K.B. 1758) (bona fide purchaser of stolen bank note
has good title).
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legal literature at about the same time that lawyers began to be
fascinated by the history of commercial law and the "law merchant."
As has often been noted, it is very difficult to define specifically the
concept of the "law merchant." For example, there is considerable
dispute about whether references to the law merchant in early legal
sources should be taken as referring to a body of substantive law
separate and distinct from the common law, or only to more ex-
peditious procedures than those of ,the common law courts. For
present purposes, the interesting phenomenon is that the most
influential works espousing the fully developed theory that the law
merchant was a separate body of substantive law appeared in the
late nineteenth century, at about the same time that the concept of
negotiability was coming to dominate the law of bills and notes. The
first wo~k that I have found that sets out the now familiar story of
a special mercantile law that was applied in the fair and staple courts
and then eventually adopted by the common law in the eighteenth
century was John MacDonnell's Introduction to the tenth edition of
Smith's Compendium ofMercantile Law, published in 1890. That was
followed within a year by Thomas Scrutton's enormously influential
book, Elements of Mercantile Law (1893), and Edward Jenks's essay,
On The Early History of Negotiable Instruments. 151 Within a decade,
virtually all of the treatises on the law of bills and notes incorporated
the results of these works on legal history. As we have seen, a
summary account of the evolution of the law merchant and its
triumphant struggle with the common law is a standard accoutre-
ment of the treatises on bills and notes from the turn of the century
to the present. 152
lSI 9 LAW. Q. REv. 70 (1893).
IS2 Although the bills and notes treatises of the classical era did commonly include a
brief discussion of the history of bills and notes, these passages were quite different from
those that we find in the twentieth century works. The twentieth century books tell a
jurisprudential story: the focus is the incorporation of the law merchant into the common
law. By contrast, the classical era treatises offer a simple account of commercial history: they
give brief anecdotal or apocryphal accounts of early uses of bills of exchange and promissory
notes, and of the seventeenth century cases in the common law courts involving bills and
notes. There is generally no mention of mercantile courts at fairs and markets, nor any
suggestion that the law of bills and notes was a part of an alien body of substantive law that
was not applied in the regular English courts until the "incorporation" in the eighteenth
century. Rather, the development of the law of bills and notes was described as an adaptation
of English law to developing commercial practice. Byles, for example, describes the devel-
opment of English law on bills as follows:
At the first introduction of bills of exchange, however, the English Courts of
Law regarded them with a jealous and evil eye, allowing them only between
merchants; but their obvious advantages soon compelled the Judges to sanction
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The view that negotiability has always been the keystone of the
law of bills and notes may, then, come not from commercial law,
but from legal history. It is quite clear that the concept of negotia-
bility has played a central role in the theory of commercial legal
history developed in the late nineteenth century. In discussions of
the battle of the law merchant with the common law, negotiability
is invariably cited as the key example of an issue on which the two
bodies of law differed. Accordingly, legal historians have tended to
assume that determining the ext~nt to which the common law at a
particular period recognized the principle of negotiability provides
the "acid test" of the progress of incorporation. 153 The late nine-
teenth century transformation of the law of bills and notes may be
an instance of mutually reinforcing, if not circular, influences be-
tween legal history and substantive commercial law. The promi-
nence of the concept of negotiability in modern substantive com-
merciallaw may be a reflection of the key role that negotiability has
played in the incorporation theory of commercial legal history.
Conversely, the incorporation theory may have developed in large
measure out of the effort to explain how the legal system accom-
modated the assumed universal mercantile need for rules permit-
ting debt instruments to circulate free from claims and defenses.
These thoughts and surmises certainly do not provide any de-
finitive account of the development in the late nineteenth century
of the myth that negotiability has always been the keystone of the
law of bills and notes. A satisfactory explanation of the late nine-
teenth century transformation of the law of bills and notes would
require a far more detailed examination of commercial practice and
their use by all persons; and of late years the policy of the Bench has been
industriously to remove every impediment, and add all possible facilities to
these wheels of the vast commercial system.
J. BYLES, supra note 13, at x. Even Chitty, who emphasizes the contrast between the law of
bills and the basic English rule of the inalienability of choses in action more -than any other
author of the classical era, speaks of the law of bills as a native development of English law:
In short, it may be observed, that our courts, subservient, as it were, to the
necessity and circumstances of the times, have, in favour of commerce, adopted
a less technical mode"of considering personalty than realty; and, in support of
commercial transactions, have established the law merchant, which is a system of
equity founded on the rules of equity, and governed in all its parts by plain
justice and good faith.
J. CHIITY, supra note 12, at 7 (emphasis added).
155 General treatment of the law merchant will, of course, include insurance, admiralty,
and other topics, but the law of bills and notes is always cited as the pre-eminent example.
The more enthusiastic proponents of the story have even asserted that the principle of
negotiability was the law merchant. See, e.g., J.M. OGDEN, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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law from the classical era to the present, and of general trends in
late nineteenth century legal thought, than I have provided in this
article. Leaving that problem unresolved, I shall turn to some
thoughts on other unanswered questions; for whether or not we
can find a satisfactory explanation of the rise of the myth of nego-
tiability, the fact that the myth is false has various implications for
modern commercial law and for legal history.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN COMMERCIAL LAW
The principal effect of the myth of negotiability on modern
commercial law is that the concept of negotiability plays a central
role in the organization of the statutes, treatises, and course books.
Yet, if the concept of negotiability is not a response to a universal
mercantile need, but a somewhat peculiar phenomenon of late nine-
teenth century legal thought, then it is by no means obvious that it
should playa dominant role in the organization of commercial law
in the late twentieth century.
A lawyer or law student asked to explain to a layman what
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is about would probably
say something like, "Well, it's about checks and promissory notes
and things like that." Checks and notes are common features of
ordinary financial life, so it seems entirely sensible that there should
be a body of law designed to specify the rights and duties of users
of such instruments, just as in the eighteenth century there was an
exogenously defined body of law governing the problems that arose
in connection with the use of bills and notes in the pre-modern
payment system. Although it might make sense to have a special
body of law for notes used as standard form contracts in lending
transactions, or checks used as standard form instructions in pay-
ment transactions, Article 3 is no such thing. Perhaps the clearest
instance of the incongruity between law and practice is the formal
definition of "negotiable instrument" that determines whether a
given instrument is governed by Article 3. It is standard practice in
commercial paper casebooks to begin with a section posing the
difficulties of determining whether such things as floating interest
rate notes, money orders, travelers checks, credit card slips, credit
union drafts,. and the like fit within the Article 3 definition of
negotiable instrument. One has the suspicion that the reason for
raising these problems toward the beginning of the course is to
show students that some interesting and important modern issues
really lurk in the dry classificatory rules of Part 1 of Article 3. Yet,
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isn't the real moral precisely the opposite: if there is something
important about Article 3, why do bankers and businessmen seem
to have no reluctance about devising and using a myriad of forms
of instruments that either are not covered by Article 3, or are
questionably covered?
Similarly, the content of Article 3 is determined less by the
actual problems that arise in connection with modern uses of notes
or checks, than by the needs of a system' of rules adapted to a
theoretical system in which instruments are circulated from party
to party. In modern commercial practice, notes used as simple
lending contracts generally remain in the hands of the lender, and
checks are not circulated but immediately deposited for collection.
The great bulk of Article 3, however, is devoted to rules governing
the mechanics of transfer of instruments and specifying the rights
of transferees. Arcane points are amply covered, such as whether
it is permissible to place indorsements on a separate sheet of paper
once the back of the note has been filled up with prior indorse-
ments. 154 On the other hand, we find essentially nothing about
recurring real world problems involving the use of promissory
notes, such as whether taking a note for a debt amounts to satisfac-
tion of the prior debt; 155 whether giving a note or renewal note for
a debt precludes the debtor from raising defenses of which he had
knowledge at the time the note was given; 156 whether cancellation
of a note by mistake or fraud operates as a discharge of the d~bt;157
whether parol evidence is admissible to alter the apparent terms of
a note;158 whether a purported agent has authority to bind his
principal to a note,159 and so on. Indeed, it is entirely possible for
154 V.C.C. § 3-202(5).
155 Section 3-802(1) says only that "unless otherwise agreed" taking an instrument for
an obligation only suspends the obligation. As the voluminous caselaw indicates, the difficult
issue is to specify what circumstances should be construed as amounting to such an agreement.
See, e.g., Annotation, Renewal Note Signed by One Comaker as Discharge of Nonsigning Comakers,
43 A.L.R.3d 246 (1972); Annotation, Renewal Note as Discharging Original Obligation or In-
debtedness, 52 A.L.R. 1416 (1928).
156 See, e.g., Annotation, Account Stated Based Upon Check or Note Tendered in Payment of
Debt, 46 A.L.R.3d 1325 (1972); Annotation, Trade Acceptance or Unsecured Note or Bill ofDebtor
as Accord and Satisfaction, 62 A.L.R. 751 (1929).
157 See, e.g., Annotation, Unintentional Cancellation of Negotiable Instrument Under UCC
Article 3,59 A.L.R. 4th 617 (1988).
158 See, e.g., Annotation, Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Show that a Bill or Note was
Conditional, or Givenfor a Special Purpose, 20 A.L.R. 421 (1922) & supp.; 54 A.L.R. 702 (1928);
105 A.L.R. 1346 (1936); Annotation, Parol-Evidence Rule: Evidence of Agreements as to Manner
or Medium of Payment of Bill or Note, or as to Credit, Set-Off, or Counterclaim with Respect to the
Same, 71 A.L.R. 548 (1931).
159 Section 3-403 spells out in some detail the rules on whether the agent is personally
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a law student to attain a complete mastery of "Article 3," and yet
never have gained any useful sense of how to resolve many of the
problems that actually arise in connection with the use of notes in
the modern world.
In some respects, we are beginning to see the law of commercial
paper discarding the concept of negotiability as an organizational
principle. Increasingly, the law of the check system is being de-
scribed not as part of the law of negotiable instruments, but as one
aspect of the law of payment systems, along with other funds trans-
fer mechanisms, such as bank credit cards and electronic funds
transfers. Fortunately, the agenda for the law of payments systems
is not being set by definitional rules about the form of instruments
or by abstract concerns about rules of transfer. Rather, an exami-
nation of the legal literature of payment systems in the 1970s and
1980s suggests that the legal issues are determined by the practical
problems of specifying the rights and duties of providers and users
of funds transfer systems: When is payment final? To what extent
are providers of funds transfer services liable for consequential
~ damages from failure to complete transfers? When do deposited
funds become available for withdrawal? What principles should be
used in the allocating of risks of fraudulent transfers? Indeed,
within another decade or so, this aspect of commercial law may have
recovered fully from the myth of negotiability and become again
what the classical law of bills and notes actually was-an exogenously
defined law of the payment transactions actually used in commerce.
It is far less clear what will or should happen to the remaining
core of negotiable instruments law after the law of the check-based
payments system migrates from Article 3 to some form of compre-
hensive payments system law. Indeed, it is not clear what remains.
If Gilmore was right in thinking that consumer lending transactions
made negotiability important in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century, then the principal subject matter of the law of nego-
tiable instruments was eliminated by the judicial, legislative, and
administrative developments of the 1970s that made the holder in
due course rules inapplicable in consumer transactions. 16o More-
liable, but leaves to general agency law the question that is usually of far more concern to
someone trying to enforce the debt-whether the principal is bound. By contrast, the treatises
of the classical era and nineteenth century contained lengthy chapters dealing with the
problems of agency and capacity that arose in connection with instruments purporting to
bind principals, corporations, partnerships, and the like.
160 Similarly, if the ris~ of the concept of negotiability is to be attributed to developments
in the markets for investment securities, then we are left with the peculiar circumstance that
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over, once we realize that the history of bills and notes is not nearly
as simple as it has usually been portrayed, it is no longer so clear
that exclusion of consumer transactions from the scope of the
horder in due course doctrine is a sufficient response to the prob-
lems of adapting negotiable instruments law to modern practice.
Consider, for example, a business transaction of essentially the
same form as the consumer transactions to which the holder in due
course rules were applied until the developments of the 1970s.
Suppose that a business is sold, the seller takes a note for part of
the purchase price, and the seller discounts that note with a bank
or other financial entity. If the buyer seeks to withhold payments
on the note upon discovery that the representations and warranties
in the purchase and sale agreement were false, is it so clear that the
bank should be given holder in due course status? If the holder in
due course rules developed in response to credit transactions in
which borrowers raised money by issuing notes expecting tp.em to
be traded in a credit market, in which private notes were frequently
traded from party to party, then whether it is appropriate to con-
tinue to apply the holder in due course rules in business transactions
depends on whether the modern credit system continues to operate
in that fashion. If the characteristic discounting transaction in the
business setting is simply a transfer of the note from the payee to
a financier who retains it to maturity, then one might well contend
that the transaction, being structurally identical to the classic con-
sumer finance transaction, should be treated in the same fashion.
I do not, of course, contend that this article has demonstrated
that the concept of negotiability plays no useful role in any modern
commercial transaction, or that the body oflaw now found in Article
3 is entirely otiose. On the other hand, if my arguments about the
legal history of the law of bills and notes are correct, then at least
one major foundation of much argumentation about modern com-
mercial law is severely undercut. In twentieth century negotiable
instruments law, one commonly finds arguments of the gene:r:al
form that although various aspects of this body of law seem odd,
and particular rules may seem harsh or even unfair, the law of
negotiable instruments has stood the test of time and shown itself
to promote the general good of commerce. If the traditional account
the instruments that may have given rise to the concept of negotiability are no longer
governed by the "law of negotiable instruments." With the enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, the law of investment securities split off from its ancestry in the law of bills
and notes and developed into a separate body oflaw, now governed by Article 8 of the Code.
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of the history of negotiability is a myth, then such appeals to the
lessons of history are quite unjustifiable. Rather, the application of
negotiability concepts to particular modern transactions must be
assessed in light of the particular needs of those transactions. 161
IX. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL HISTORY
The assumptions that the concept of negotiability have always
been the keystone of the law of bills and notes, and that the law of
bills and notes developed in response to a universal mercantile need
for debt instruments that could circulate as payment media free
from defenses and claims, have had a significant impact on the
study of the history of commercial law. Thus, the major implication
of the findings presented in this article is that the traditional ac-
counts of commercial legal history need to be re-examined.
At the most general level, the thesis that negotiability was a
relatively unimportant aspect of the law of bills and notes in the
classical era calls into question one of the foundations of the stan-
dard accounts of the incorporation of the law merchant into the
common law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although
the incorporation theory has been widely accepted by twentieth
century scholars of commercial law and legal history, it has not gone
unchallenged. In an important article published in 1979, the En-
glish legal historian John Baker argued that recent research in the
early records of the common law courts refutes one of the central
tenets of the incorporation theory-that prior to the seventeenth
century the common law courts did not handle cases concerning
bills. 162 Baker suggests that the seemingly sudden appearance of
cases concerning bills in the seventeenth century is not the result of
incorporation of an alien body of law, but of developments in plead-
ing rules purely internal to the common law system. Roughly, Bak-
er's thesis is that prior to the development of assumpsit as a mech-
anism for the enforcement of contractual obligations, the pleadings
-
161 I have elsewhere argued that such an assessment leads to the conclusion that nego-
tiability concepts are at best irrelevant, and often harmful, both in modern payment systems
law, see Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based
Payment System, 65 TEX. L. REV. 929, 943-45 (1987), and modern law of investment securities,
see Rogers, Negotiability as a System 'of Title Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197 (1987). A
forthcoming article by Professor Charles Mooney of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School sets out a far more comprehensive and sophisticated argument for moving beyond
the concept of negotiability in the law of investment securities.
162 Baker, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295
(1979).
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in an action involving a debt represented by a bill would not have
mentioned the bill explicitly, so that the surviving written records
generally do not reveal whether suits involved such instruments.
Proceeding from an entirely different perspective, my colleague
Daniel R. Coquillette has confirmed Baker's suspicions about the
incorporation theory. Based on his exhaustive study of the work of
the English Civilians, Coquillette has argued that although elaborate
discussions of legal issues involving bills of exchange are found in
the works of continental and English civilian authors in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, virtually no evidence exists that the En-
glish common law actually drew on these sources iIi developing the
substantive law of bills in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries.163
The evidence presented in this article about actual commercial
practice and law concerning bills and notes in the classical era
provides yet another basis for questioning the incorporation theory.
The usual accounts of the incorporation of the law merchant into
the common law are largely based on the assumption that the strug-
gle for recognition of the law merchant's principle of negotiability
was the central theme of the development of the law of bills and
notes. If I am right in thinking that this account of negotiability is
pure myth, then to the extent that the incorporation theory devel-
oped as an explanation of the process by which the common law
accommodated the universal mercantile need for negotiability, the
theory is an answer to a misleading question.
Turning from general jurisprudential theories about the de-
velopment of commerciaUaw to the specifics of the history of the
law of bills and notes, the evidence presented in this article suggests
that much of the traditional account of the history of negotiable
instruments law requires re-examination. Although there is an ex-
tensive body of work on the history of the law of bills and notes,164
the starting point of essentially all of the work has been the view of
negotiable instruments law that I have argued is a myth. Legal
16S Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV: The Nature of Civilian Influence on
Modem Anglo-American Commercial Law, 67 B.U.L: REv. 877 (1987).
164 Among the standard works are J.M. HOLDEN, THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS IN ENGLISH LAw (1955); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113-76 (2d
ed. 1937); T.E. SCRUTTON, THE ELEMENTS OF MERCANTILE LAw 22-40 (1891); T.A. STREET,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 323-428 (1906); Beutel, The Development ofNegotiable
Instruments in Early English Law, 51 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1938); Fifoot, The Development of the'
Law ofNegotiable Instruments, 1938 J. INST. BANKERS 433; Jenks, The Early History ofNegotiable
Instruments, 9 L.Q. REv. 70 (1893).
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historians have assumed that the law of biIIs and notes developed
in response to a universal mercantile need for debt instruments that
could circulate as payment media free from defenses and claims.
Accordingly, the objective of legal historians in this field has been
to trace the process by which the principle ofnegotiability developed
in English law. Perhaps nowhere is this focus made more explicit
than in the most influential treatment of the history of negotiable
instruments law, W.S. Holdsworth's discussion in the eighth volume
of his monumental History of English Law. Holdsworth begins his
discussion of the history of negotiable instruments law with a defi-
nition of negotiable instruments as instruments possessing the three
legal characteristics of transferability, presumption of consideration,
and the special rights given to bona fide purchasers. Holdsworth
then sets his task to be as follows: "Thus the questions which I must
try to answer are, first, what were the germs from which instruments
having these qualities were developed; and, secondly, what were the
technical processes by which this development took place?"165 Hold-
sworth is not proposing to examine the use of instruments such as
biIIs and notes in early commerce, the legal problems presented by
such uses, or the legal solutions and techniques applied to such
problems. Rather, he makes it quite explicit that his endeavor is to
trace the development of instruments having the specific legal char-
acteristics that by his time had come to be regarded as the central
aspects of the doctrine of negotiability.
Although Holdsworth is unusually explicit in his statement of
the principle by which he defines his subject, the same approach is
found in the work of essentially every other legal historian who has
written on this topic since the late nineteenth century. A prime
example is Thomas Scrutton's influential book on mercantile law
and history.166 Scrutton's chapter on the history of negotiable in-
struments is devoted exclusively to a discussion of the process by
which negotiable instruments law threw off the common law prin-
ciples that choses in action are not transferrable and that a trans-
feree can get no better title than his transferor. There is little
discussion of how merchants actually used the instruments in ques-
tion, and no mention of any legal issues or problems other than
those related to the concept of negotiability in the sense of the
special rights given to bona fide purchasers.
165 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 164, at 114 (emphasis added).
166 T.E. SCRUTTON, supra note 164.
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One striking indication of the way in which the legal history of
negotiable instruments law has been influenced by the myth of
negotiability is the matter of the data that are thought to be relevant
to the story. For example, one of the earliest modern treatments of
the legal history of negotiable instruments law is Professor Jenks's
1893 article. 167 Jenks begins by noting the evidence that some form
of bills of exchange were in use among Italian merchants from at
least the beginning of the fifteenth century. Then, without any
discussion of how those instruments might actually have been used,
he turns to an explanation of how the legal system adapted itself to
those features of negotiable instruments that are, as he puts it,
"wholly opposed to the spirit of early law." Having slipped-prob-
ably unknowingly-from the question of the history of the negoti-
able instruments in the sense of actual merchant practices and law,
into the history of legal concepts of transfer of rights, any writing
that was in any way related to transfer of rights became for Jenks
a significant datum in the story, whether or not it had anything to
do with the mercantile practices that were the starting point. Ac-
cordingly, the remainder ofJenks's article describes the findings of
continental legal historians concerning a miscellany of instruments,
ranging from a writing "in which a monk makes over to a .church
(amongst other things) the right to avenge his death if he shall be
murdered," to various clauses in wills concerning the designation
of guardians and the like, to real estate conveyance instruments, as
well as bonds evidencing debts and early bills of exchange. If one
started out with an open mind to write a history of mercantile credit
and payment instruments, it is hardly likely that the first thing that
would come to mind would be instruments whereby monks make
over inchoate wergild rights.
Unquestionably, the conclusions reached by the legal historians
about the history of the law of bills and notes have been profoundly
influenced by the single-minded focus on the concept of negotia-
bility. One searches the writings of the legal historians in vain for
any serious discussion of what merchants were actually doing with
the writings that are taken to be the focus of the inquiry, for any
serious examination of whether the transferability of debt instru-
ments was actually a significant matter to the mercantile community,
or for any recognition that there may have been changes in com-
mercial practice and needs over the millennia. Rather, one finds an
167 Jenks, supra note 164.
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account that an irreverent wag might term the "Holy Grailing"
theory of the history of bills and notes: a history dedicated to finding
the earliest instance of the use of the "order clause" or the "bearer
clause" in an effort to push back further and further toward the
discovery of that momentous day when the Principle of Negotiabil-
ity first dawned on the human consciousness.
Indeed, the ahistorical nature of the standard accounts of the
history of the law of bills and notes is perhaps the most surprising
thing about them. The basic assumption of legal history in this area
has been that mercantile conditions have remained fundamentally
unchanged over the centuries. Merchants have always needed debt
instruments that were freely transferrable as a means of payment;
the only problem has been to persuade the legal system to recognize
this universal need and work out the details of a system of rules
that accommodates it. Thus, we have an established tradition of
commercial legal history that eliminates, at the level of axiom, any
need for inquiry into the influence of economic, financial, political,
or social forces and conflicts on the development of legal rules and
institutions.
The discussion of the actual law of bills and notes in the classical
era set out in this article provides some indication of what may be
found by re-examining the history of this body of law free from
the assumptions of the myth of negotiability. For example, we have
seen that many of the specific rules of classical bills and notes law
reflected the needs of the commission agent system of distribution.
Similarly, we have seen that many of the problems that strike a
modern observer as disputes over fine points of a law gone wild
with its own technicalities were actually the product of the under-
standable litigiousness of those caught in the high stakes game of
musical chairs that inevitably followed the dishonor of bills. In a
sense, these results are not in the least surprising. The law of bills
and notes in the classical era was a product of the characteristic
economic transactions of the era. Presumably, similar conclusions
would emerge from further examination of the history of the law
of bills and notes in the classical era and in earlier or later periods.
Far from throwing the history of commercial law into turmoil,
rejection of the myth of negotiability opens the door to the sort of
examination of relationships between law and economic, political,
or social forces that is commonplace in every other field of legal
history.
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